Del i serien Cornell Studies in Security Affairs

Tet Offensive

Intelligence Failure in War

Inbunden, Engelska, 1991

AvJames J. Wirtz

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In this account of one of the worst intelligence failures in Americanhistory, James J. Wirtz explains why U.S. forces were surprised by the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive in 1968. Wirtz reconstructs the turning point of the Vietnam War in unprecedented detail. Drawing upon Vietcong and recently declassified U.S. sources, he is able to trace the strategy and unfolding of the Tet campaign as well as the U.S. response.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum1991-12-03
Mått155 x 235 x 25 mm
Vikt907 g
FormatInbunden
SpråkEngelska
SerieCornell Studies in Security Affairs
Antal sidor272
FörlagCornell University Press
ISBN9780801424861

Tillhör följande kategorier

Asiens historia inom Historia och arkeologi

IntroductionPART I: "THE BIG VICTORY, THE GREAT TASK"1. The Communist Debate over Strategy2. Preparations, and Objectives of the Tet OffensivePART II: THE ORIGINS OF SURPRISE3. The Sources of American Biases4. Missing the Signals: July–November 19675. Missing the Signals: December 1967–30 January 19686. Reacting to the Tet OffensiveConclusion: Explaining the Failure of IntelligenceBibliographyIndex

A fascinating book. Combining the disciplines of history and political science with insights from psychological theory, Wirtz has produced both a pathbreaking analysis and a cautionary tale.- Heath Twichell (Naval War College Review) This excellently researched and written volume is a positive addition to our understanding of the event that marked the turning point in U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War.- John R. Finch (Military Review) Wirtz analyzes both the North Vietnamese plans and the American effort to counter them in exquisite detail.... His book is a valuable addition to our knowledge of the Vietnam conflict and the pitfalls facing an intelligence effort to divine an enemy's plans.- Roger Hilsman (Political Science Quarterly) Wirtz provides a persuasive explanation for how the Vietnamese achieved surprise at Tet, even though the Americans had intelligence warning them of the attack. His book should be required reading for those interested in this key aspect of the Vietnam War and in the study of intelligence failures.- Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. (Journal of American History)