Cornell Studies in Security Affairs – serie

Covert Regime Change

America's Secret Cold War

Unclear Physics

Why Iraq and Libya Failed to Build Nuclear Weapons

Conventional Deterrence

Sources of Military Doctrine

France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars

Ideology of the Offensive

Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914

Ultimate Enemy

British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933–1939

Japan Prepares for Total War

The Search for Economic Security, 1919–1941

Origins of Alliances

Liddell Hart and the Weight of History

Public Opinion and National Security in Western Europe

Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution

Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon

Substitute for Victory

The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks

Military Organizations, Complex Machines

Modernization in the U.S. Armed Services

Tet Offensive

Intelligence Failure in War

Myths of Empire

Domestic Politics and International Ambition

Winning the Next War

Innovation and the Modern Military

Inadvertent Escalation

Conventional War and Nuclear Risks

Cooperation Under Fire

Anglo-German Restraint During World War II

Reputation and International Politics

Nixon Administration and the Making of U.S. Nuclear Strategy

Bombing to Win

Air Power and Coercion in War

Causes of War

Power and the Roots of Conflict

Revolution and War

Anatomy of Mistrust

U.S.-Soviet Relations During the Cold War

Liberal Peace, Liberal War

American Politics and International Security

Alliance Politics

Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers

Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917–1945

Whole World on Fire

Organizations, Knowledge, and Nuclear Weapons Devastation

Mortal Friends, Best Enemies

German-Russian Cooperation After the Cold War