Well-Being and Theism

Linking Ethics to God

Häftad, Engelska, 2014

Av William A. Lauinger

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Well-Being and Theism is divided into two distinctive parts. The first part argues that desire-fulfillment welfare theories fail to capture the 'good' part of 'good for', and that objective list welfare theories fail to capture the 'for' part of 'good for'. Then, with the aim of capturing both of these parts of 'good for', a hybrid theory-one which places both a value constraint and a desire constraint on well-being-is advanced. Lauinger then defends this proposition, which he calls the desire-perfectionism theory, against possible objections. In the second part, Lauinger explores the question of what metaphysics best supports the account of well-being defended in the first part. It is argued that there are two general metaphysical routes that might convincingly be taken here, and that each one leads us toward theism.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2014-03-27
Mått152 x 229 x undefined mm
Vikt270 g
FormatHäftad
SpråkEngelska
SerieBloomsbury Studies in Philosophy of Religion
Antal sidor208
FörlagBloomsbury Publishing Plc
ISBN9781628926880

Tillhör följande kategorier

Religion: allmänt inom Filosofi och religion

Introduction Part One: The No Priority TheoryChapter One: General Remarks on Theories of Well-Being Chapter Two: Desire-fulfillment TheoriesChapter Three: Objective List Theories Chapter Four: The No Priority Theory Chapter Five: Hybrid Theories in General Part Two: What Metaphysics Best Supports the Proposed Account of Well-Being?Chapter Six: An Evolutionary Grounding for the No Priority TheoryChapter Seven: An Aristotelian Grounding for the No Priority TheoryChapter Eight: On Desires as Infinite in CharacterConclusionBibliographyIndex

In Well-Being and Theism, William Lauinger defends a new and provocative theory of human well-being—the desire-perfectionist view. His account draws on insights from the objective list and desire-fulfillment traditions, while challenging key assumptions of these views. In this way, Lauinger seeks to move beyond the long-standing impasse between these approaches and break new ground with his own theory. As his argument progresses, Lauinger introduces several distinctions which will be of interest to all theorists of well-being. He also connects the well-being debate to recent developments in psychology, metaethics, and the philosophy of religion. Full of examples from everyday life, Lauinger's volume is a pleasure to read and a welcome contribution to the well-being debate.