This is Philosophy of Science

FRANZ-PETER GRIESMAIER is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wyoming, where he teaches history and philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, logic, and epistemology. He is the author of Rationality and Epistemic Sophistication.JEFFREY A. LOCKWOOD is a Professor of Natural Sciences & Humanities at the University of Wyoming. He worked for 15 years in scientific research and is a recipient of the Pushcart Prize and the John Burroughs award. Professor Lockwood’s work has been featured in the Best American Science and Nature Writing.

• Preface ixAcknowledgments xiAbout the Companion Website xii1 Pillars of Science: Reasons, Knowledge, and Truth 11.1 Epistemic Reasons 21.2 Reasoning from Evidence 71.3 Knowledge and Truth 111.4 Facts, Hypotheses, and Theories 121.5 Conclusion 172 Evidence, Observation, and Measurement 192.1 The Promises of Evidence 192.2 Basic Evidence and Derived Evidence 212.3 Measurement 262.4 Conclusion 313 Uses of Evidence 333.1 From Observation to Hypothesis 333.2 Theory Appraisal 363.3 The Demarcation Problem 423.4 Conclusion 494 Evidence, Rationality, and Disagreement 514.1 From Weak to Strong Evidence 514.2 Evidence and Rationality 604.3 Explaining Scientific Disagreement 634.4 Conclusion 695 The Nature of Probability 715.1 Basics of Probability 715.2 Interpretations of Probability 735.3 Probabilities as Credences 745.4 Epistemic Probabilities 795.5 Probabilities as Objective Chances 815.6 Probabilities and Defeasible Reasoning 845.7 Fallacies 865.8 Conclusion 876 Do Not Be Misled: Confounds and Controls 886.1 Trials and Errors 886.2 Treatment and Control 896.3 Randomization 946.4 Conclusion 997 Physical Experiments and Their Design 1017.1 Historical Remarks 1017.2 Setting Experimental Parameters 1027.3 Dependent and Independent Variables 1037.4 Learning from Experiment 1067.5 Types of Errors: Pick Your Poison 1127.6 Relationships between Experiment and Theory 1137.7 Conclusion 1178 Experimental Methods That They Don’t Teach 1198.1 Found and Natural Experiments 1198.2 Thought Experiments 1228.3 The Structure and Evidential Value of Thought Experiments 1338.4 Learning from TEs 1368.5 The Ubiquity of Thought Experiments 1398.6 Are Computer Simulations Thought Experiments? 1418.7 Conclusion 1429 Models: Useful Lies and Informative Fictions 1449.1 The Nature of Models 1469.2 Modelling Techniques 1539.3 Analogies 1569.4 Learning from Models 1599.5 Conclusion 16510 Causation and Causal Inference 16710.1 What’s the Problem with Causation? 16710.2 Hume’s Challenge 16810.3 Causation as Mere Regularities 17010.4 Conserved Quantities to the Rescue? 17110.5 Causation and Manipulation 17310.6 Conclusion 17711 Strange Causation – Time Travel and Remote Action 17911.1 On Influencing the Past 18011.2 Quantum Mechanics and Locality 19111.3 Conclusion 19612 But Is Any of It Real? 19812.1 Theories and Truth 19812.2 A Map of the Views 19912.3 Are Groups Real? 20112.4 Laws of Nature 20512.5 Is Everything Real Observable? 20812.6 Realism vs. Antirealism 21312.7 Structural Realism 21812.8 Realism and Explanation 21912.9 Conclusion 22113 Explanation and Understanding 22313.1 The Deductive-Nomological Model 22413.2 The Causal Model 22913.3 The Unificationist Model 23113.4 The Pragmatic Model 23413.5 What about Realism? 23713.6 Conclusion 23814 Fundamental Theories and the Organization of Science 24014.1 The Layer Cake Model 24214.2 Classical Reductionism 24314.3 Functional Concepts 24814.4 The Functional Model 25014.5 Emergence 25314.6 Interdisciplinary Research 25714.7 Conclusion 25915 Scientific Progress 26215.1 Science and Technology 26315.2 Goals of Science 26415.3 Reduction in the Limit 26515.4 How Theories Are Born 26615.5 What Kind of Progress? 26915.6 From Theories to Research Programmes 27515.7 Methodological Anarchism 27715.8 Incommensurability 27915.9 Structural Realism and Progress 28415.10 Conclusion 286Index 288