The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy

Matthew Kroenig is an Associate Professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and the Deputy Director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. He is the author or editor of seven books, including The Return of Great Power Rivalry: Democracy versus Autocracy from the Ancient World to the Present.

• Preface New Foreword for the Paperback Edition Abbreviations and Acronyms Introduction PART I. The Advantages of Nuclear Advantages Chapter 1. Toward a New Theory of Nuclear Deterrence: The Superiority-Brinkmanship Synthesis Theory Chapter 2. Nuclear War Outcomes Chapter 3. The Correlates of Nuclear Crisis Outcomes Chapter 4. The Mechanisms of Nuclear Crisis Outcomes Chapter 5. Nuclear Deterrence and Compellence PART II. The Disadvantages of Nuclear Advantages? Chapter 6. Strategic Stability Chapter 7. Arms Races Chapter 8. Nuclear Nonproliferation Chapter 9. The Defense Budget Conclusion Notes Bibliography Index

Because there is now more available data, the time is right to reexamine some long-held assumptions about whether a significant advantage in nuclear weapons is, in fact, an advantage. Matthew Kroenig offers new theoretical and methodological perspectives in his attempt to do just that. Theoretically, he proposes a synthesis of two theories to argue that nuclear superiority allows for a state to be more aggressive in international crises. Methodologically, he seeks to demonstrate the effect a single independent variable has on multiple dependent variables. Either one of these advances would represent a significant contribution to the literature of nuclear statecraft and compellence. Kroenig combines both in a thorough and compelling work.