Rational Choice Politics

• VOLUME 1: SOCIAL CHOICE AND EQUILIBRIUMPart 1: Social ChoiceOn the Rationale of Group Decision-making - Duncan Black A Direct Proof of Arrow′ s Theorem - Julian H. Blau A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions - Amaryta Sen Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result - Allan GibbardPart 2: Equilibrium A Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibility under Majority Rule - Charles R. Plott Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control - Richard D. McKelveyGeneric Instability of Majority Rule - Norman SchofieldImplications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions - William H. Riker On 64%-Majority Rule - Andrew Caplin and Barry Nalebuff Covering, Dominance, and Institution Free Properties of Social Choice - Richard D McKelvey The Uncovered Set and the Core - Gary C. Cox Bargaining in Legislatures - David P. Baron and John Ferejohn A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice - Jeffrey S. Banks and John Duggan Part 3: Electoral SystemsElectoral Equilibrium under Alternative Voting Institutions - Gary CoxA Voting Model Implying Duverger′s Law and Positive Turnout - Timothy J. Fedderson Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems - Massimo Morelli VOLUME 2: VOTING, ELECTIONS AND PRESSURE POLITICSPart 4: Voting and ElectionsA Theory of the Calculus of Voting - William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty - Thomas R. Palfrey and Howard RosenthalThe Swing Voter′s Curse - Timothy J. Fedderson and Wolfgang Pesendorfer Voting as Communicating - Thomas Pickety The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model - Robert J. BarroIncumbent Performance and Electoral Control - John Ferejohn Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate motivations, uncertainty and convergence - Randall L. Calvert Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two Party System with Rational Voters - Alberto Alesina An Economic Model of Representative Democracy - Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate A Dynamical Model of Political Equilibrium - Gerald H. Kramer Elections, Coalitions, and Outcomes - David Austin-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks Elections, Governments and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems Pressure Politics - David P. Baron and Daniel DiermeierPart 5: Pressure PoliticsThe Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft - Gordon Tullock The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society - Anne O. KruegerA Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence - Gary Becker On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests - Stephen Coates and Stephen Morris Legislators and Interest Groups: How unorganized interests get represented - Arthur T. Denzau and Michael C. MungerProtection for Sale - Gene Grossman and Elhanen Helpman The Independent Judiciary in an Interest Group Perspective - William M. Landes and Richard A. PosnerVOLUME 3: LEGISLATURESPart 6: BureaucracySophisticated Sincerity: Voting over endogenous agendas - David Austen-Smith Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees: An analysis of sincere and sophisticated behavior - Arthur T. Denzau and Robert J. Mackay Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure - Daniel Diermeier and Timothy J. FeddersonBicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures - Daniel Diermeier and Roger B. Myerson Sophisticated Voting and Agenda Independence in the Distributive Politics Setting - John Ferejohn, Fiorina P. Morris and Richard D. McKelvey Collective Decision Making and Standing Committee: An informational rationale for restrictive amendment procedures - Thomas W. Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel Buying Supermajorities - Timothy Groseclose and James Snyder Where′s the Party? - Keith Krehbiel On Division of the Question - John B. Kadane Coalitions and Cabinet Government - Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle Committee Design with Endogenous Information - Nicola Persico Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo - Thomas Romer and Howard Rosenthal Modelling the Interaction of Parties, Activists and Voters: Why is the political center empty? - Norman Schofield and Itai Sened Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multi-dimensional Voting Models - Kenneth A. Shepsle The Industrial Organization of Congress - Barry R. Weingast and William J. Marshall VOLUME 4: BUREAUCRACY, CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE STATEPart 7: BureaucracyAgency Budgets, Cost Information, and Auditing - Jeffrey S. Banks Bureaucratic Expertise versus Legislative Authority: A model of deception and monitoring in budgeting - Jonathan Bendor, Serge Taylor and Roland Van Gaalen Delegation and the Structure of Policy-Making: A transactions cost politics approach - David Epstein and Sharyn O′Halloren Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy - John Ferejohn and Charles ShipanAdministrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control - Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police patrols versus fire alarms - Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz Part 8: Constitutional ArrangementsThe Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-preserving federalism and economic development - Barry R. Weingast A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures - Charles M. Tiebout An Economic Theory of Clubs - James M. Buchanan The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in government - Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto players and presidentialism, parliamentarism, multi-cameralism, and multipartism - George Tsebelis Part 9: The StateDictatorship, Democracy and Development - Mancur Olson Constitutions and Commitment: The evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth century england - Douglas C. North and Barry R. Weingast Coordination, Commitment and Enforcement: The case of the merchant guild - Anver Greif, Paul Milgrom and Barry R. Weingast A Rational Theory of the Size of Government - Allan H. Meltzer and Scott F. Richard Comparative Politics and Public Finance - Torsten Persson, Gérard Roland and Guido Tabellini A Theory of Political Transitions - Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson

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