Del i serien Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions

Making and Breaking Governments

Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies

Inbunden, Engelska, 1996

AvMichael Laver,Michael Laver,Kenneth A. Shepsle

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Making and Breaking Governments offers a theoretical argument about how parliamentary parties form governments, deriving from the political and social context of such government formation its generic sequential process. Based on their policy preferences, and their beliefs about what policies will be forthcoming from different conceivable governments, parties behave strategically in the game in which government portfolios are allocated. The authors construct a mathematical model of allocation of ministerial portfolios, formulated as a noncooperative game, and derive equilibria. They also derive a number of empirical hypotheses about outcomes of this game, which they then test with data drawn from most of the postwar European parliamentary democracies. The book concludes with a number of observations about departmentalistic tendencies and centripetal forces in parliamentary regimes.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum1996-01-26
Mått155 x 235 x 23 mm
Vikt539 g
FormatInbunden
SpråkEngelska
SeriePolitical Economy of Institutions and Decisions
Antal sidor316
FörlagCambridge University Press
ISBN9780521432450
UtmärkelserAmerican Political Science Association Prize

Tillhör följande kategorier

Series editors' preface; Acknowledgements; Part I. The Context: 1. Theory, institutions, and government formation; 2. The social context of government formation; 3. The government formation process; Part II. The Model: 4. Government equilibrium; 5. Strong parties; Part III. Empirical Investigations: 6. Two cases: Germany, 1987; Ireland, 1992–3; 7. Theoretical implications, data, and operationalization; 8. Exploring the model: a comparative perspective; 9. A multivariate investigation of portfolio allocation; Part IV. Applications, Extensions, and Conclusions: 10. Party systems and cabinet stability; 11. Making the model more realistic; 12. Party politics and administrative reform; 13. Governments and parliaments; Bibliography.