• 1. Introduction; Part I. Origins of the State: 2. The reason for collective choice - allocative efficiency; 3. The reason for collective choice - redistribution; Part II. Public Choice in a Direct Democracy: 4. The choice of voting rule; 5. Majority rule - positive properties; 6. Majority rule - normative properties; 7. Simple alternatives to majority rule; 8. Complicated alternatives to majority rule; 9. Exit, voice and disloyalty; Part III. Public Choice in a Representative Democracy: 10. Federalism; 11. Two-party competition - deterministic voting; 12. Two-party competition - probabilistic voting; 13. Multiparty systems; 14. The paradox of voting; 15. Rent seeking; 16. Bureaucracy; 17. Legislatures and bureaucracies; 18. Dictatorship; Part IV. Applications and Testing: 19. Political competition and macroeconomic performance; 20. Interest groups, campaign contributions and lobbying; 21. The size of government; 22. Government size and economic performance; Part V. Normative public choice: 23. Social welfare functions; 24. The impossibility of a social ordering; 25. A just social contract; 26. The constitution as a utilitarian contract; 27. Liberal rights and social choices; Part VI. What Have We Learned?: 28. Has public choice contributed anything to the study of politics?; 29. Allocation, redistribution, and public choice.

'Like all the others, this volume will become the first point of reference - the 'bible' - for all scholars in the field, both the experts and the more casual samplers. It represents an amazing effort, even more extraordinary than the earlier versions. The profession is deeply in Mueller's debt.' Geoffrey Brennan, Australian National University

• 1. Introduction; Part I. Origins of the State: 2. The reason for collective choice - allocative efficiency; 3. The reason for collective choice - redistribution; Part II. Public Choice in a Direct Democracy: 4. The choice of voting rule; 5. Majority rule - positive properties; 6. Majority rule - normative properties; 7. Simple alternatives to majority rule; 8. Complicated alternatives to majority rule; 9. Exit, voice and disloyalty; Part III. Public Choice in a Representative Democracy: 10. Federalism; 11. Two-party competition - deterministic voting; 12. Two-party competition - probabilistic voting; 13. Multiparty systems; 14. The paradox of voting; 15. Rent seeking; 16. Bureaucracy; 17. Legislatures and bureaucracies; 18. Dictatorship; Part IV. Applications and Testing: 19. Political competition and macroeconomic performance; 20. Interest groups, campaign contributions and lobbying; 21. The size of government; 22. Government size and economic performance; Part V. Normative public choice: 23. Social welfare functions; 24. The impossibility of a social ordering; 25. A just social contract; 26. The constitution as a utilitarian contract; 27. Liberal rights and social choices; Part VI. What Have We Learned?: 28. Has public choice contributed anything to the study of politics?; 29. Allocation, redistribution, and public choice.

'Like all the others, this volume will become the first point of reference - the 'bible' - for all scholars in the field, both the experts and the more casual samplers. It represents an amazing effort, even more extraordinary than the earlier versions. The profession is deeply in Mueller's debt.' Geoffrey Brennan, Australian National University

• 1. Introduction; Part I. Origins of the State: 2. The reason for collective choice - allocative efficiency; 3. The reason for collective choice - redistribution; Part II. Public Choice in a Direct Democracy: 4. The choice of voting rule; 5. Majority rule - positive properties; 6. Majority rule - normative properties; 7. Simple alternatives to majority rule; 8. Complicated alternatives to majority rule; 9. Exit, voice and disloyalty; Part III. Public Choice in a Representative Democracy: 10. Federalism; 11. Two-party competition - deterministic voting; 12. Two-party competition - probabilistic voting; 13. Multiparty systems; 14. The paradox of voting; 15. Rent seeking; 16. Bureaucracy; 17. Legislatures and bureaucracies; 18. Dictatorship; Part IV. Applications and Testing: 19. Political competition and macroeconomic performance; 20. Interest groups, campaign contributions and lobbying; 21. The size of government; 22. Government size and economic performance; Part V. Normative public choice: 23. Social welfare functions; 24. The impossibility of a social ordering; 25. A just social contract; 26. The constitution as a utilitarian contract; 27. Liberal rights and social choices; Part VI. What Have We Learned?: 28. Has public choice contributed anything to the study of politics?; 29. Allocation, redistribution, and public choice.

'Like all the others, this volume will become the first point of reference - the 'bible' - for all scholars in the field, both the experts and the more casual samplers. It represents an amazing effort, even more extraordinary than the earlier versions. The profession is deeply in Mueller's debt.' Geoffrey Brennan, Australian National University