Political Logic of Economic Reform in China

Susan L. Shirk is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, and the author of Competitive Comrades: Career Incentives and Student Strategies in China (California, 1982).

• AcknowledgmentsFormal Authority Relations Among Central CommunistParty and Government Institutions in the People'sRepublic of ChinaPART 1. INTRODUCTION1. The Political Logic of Economic Reform2. The Prereform Chinese Economy and the Decisionto Initiate Market ReformsPART 2. CHINESE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS3. Authority Relations: The Communist Party and theGovernment4. Leadership Incentives:- Political Succession andReciprocal Accountability5. Bargaining Arena: The Government Bureaucracy6. Who Is Enfranchised in the Policy-making Process?7. Decision Rules: Delegation by Consensus8. Chinese Political Institutions and the Path ofEconomic ReformsPART 3· ECONOMIC REFORM POLICY-MAKING9. Playing to the Provinces: Fiscal Decentralizationand the Politics of Reform10. Creating Vested Interests in Reform: IndustrialReform Takeoff, 1978-8111. Leadership Succession and Policy Conflict: TheChoice Between Profit Contracting and SubstitutingTax-for-Profit, 1982-83 22112. Building Bureaucratic Consensus: Formulatingthe Tax-for-Profit Policy, 1983-8413. The Power of Particularism: Abortive Price Reformand the Revival of Profit Contracting, 1985-88PART 4· CONCLUSION14. The Political Lessons of Economic Reformin ChinaBibliographyIndex