Principles of Group Solidarity

Michael Hechter is Professor of Sociology at the University of Arizona.

• Tables and Figures Preface I. Introduction II. The Problem Sociological Approaches to Group Solidarity Rational Choice Approaches to Group Solidarity III. A Theory of Group Solidarity The Extensiveness of Corporate Obligations The Probability of Compliance IV. The Necessity of Formal Controls Prosocial Motivations Gaming Strategies Among Rational Egoists V. Dependence and Party Solidarity Legislators' Dependence on the Party for Re-Election Legislators' Dependence on the Party for Patronage VI. The Production of Formal Controls Rotating Credit Associations Insurance Groups By-Products of Insurance Groups VII. The Limits of Compensation in Capitalist Firms Costs of Input Assessment Costs of Output Assessment The Internal Labor Market as a Quasi-Obligatory Group VIII. Economizing on Control Costs in Intentional Communities Monitoring Economies Sanctioning Economies IX. Conclusion Markets and Groups The Family Class and Status Solidarity Solidarity in the National Society      Bibliography Index