Imperfections and Behavior in Economic Organizations

Name: Imperfections and Behavior in Economic Organizations
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Häftad, Engelska, 2012

AvRobert P. Gilles,Pieter H.M. Ruys,Pieter H. M. Ruys

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Imperfections and Behavior in Economic Organizations analyzes the organization of economic decision making in a contemporary setting.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2012-10-09
Mått155 x 235 x 19 mm
Vikt511 g
FormatHäftad
SpråkEngelska
SerieTheory and Decision Library C
Antal sidor319
FörlagSpringer
ISBN9789401045995

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1 Inherent Imperfection of Economic Organizations.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Characterization of Economic Goods.- 3 Characterization of Economic Allocation Organizations.- 4 Interaction Between Resources and Valuations.- 2 The Kinked Demand Curve, Facilitating Practices, and Oligopolistic Coordination.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Model.- 3 Inadequacy of the Nash Equilibrium Concept.- 4 Sequentially Dominant Strategies.- 5 Two Applications.- 6 Concluding Remarks.- 3 A Revelation Principle for (Boundedly) Bayesian Rationalizable Strategies.- 1 Background.- 2 Commonly Modelled Game Forms.- 3 Bayesian Rationalizable Game Forms.- 4 Implementation.- 5 A Generalized Revelation Principle.- 6 Concentrating upon Intrinsic Types.- 7 Dominant Strategy Incentive Constraints.- 8 Bounded Modelling.- 9 Desirable Extensions.- 10 Conclusion.- 4 Widespread Externalities and Perfectly Competitive Markets: Examples.- 1 Introduction.- 2 An Automobile Market with Pollution; A Pure Public Bad Externality.- 3 The Tragedy of the Commons; Over-Exploitation Caused by Externality and Market Feedback.- 4 An Economy with Conformists and Non-Conformists; a Pure Psychological Externality.- 5 A Housing Market with Neighborhood Effects; Psychological Externalities Create Economic Value.- 6 Conclusion.- 5 Modelling of Economies with Relational Constraints on Coalition Formation.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Coalitionally Structured Economies.- 3 Relationally Structured Economies.- 4 Coalition Formation in Network Economies.- 6 Topologies as Trade Infrastructures.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Links between Traders.- 3 Cost of Contacting and Maximal Trading Groups.- 4 Number and Size of Maximal Trading Groups.- 5 Typologies.- 6 Pre-Infrastructure and Graph Topology.- 7 Demand in a Duopoly with Horizontal Product Differentiation.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Demand Functions.- 3 Rationing Schemes.- 4 Conclusions.- 8 Implementing Strong and Lower Strong Positive Association Social Choice Rules by Social Procedures.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Procedures.- 3 Stable Standards of Behavior.- 4 Strong Positive Association.- 5 Lower Strong Positive Association.- 9 Cooperation and Communication Restrictions: A Survey.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Communication Games and Solution Concepts.- 3 Dividends and Calculation Methods.- 4 Properties of Communication Games.- 5 Strategic Behavior and Endogenous Formation of Communication Links.- 6 Generalizations.- 10 Outline of the Implications of the Cooperative Nature of the Firm.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Basic Model.- 3 Ownership Structures.- 4 Equilibrium Existence Theorem.- 5 Pareto Non-Optimality.- 6 Comparative Economic Systems.- 7 Concluding Remark: Cooperative Processing of Information.- 11 Intersection Theorems on the Unit Simplex and the Simplotope.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Preliminaries.- 3 Intersection Theorems on the Unit Simplex.- 4 Intersection Theorems on the Simplotope.- 12 A Social Power Index for Hierarchically Structured Populations of Economic Agents.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Hierarchically Structured Populations.- 3 Social Power Indices.- 4 A Subjective Approach to the BG-Index.- 5 An Example.