Del 11 i serien Theory and Decision Library C

Imperfections and Behavior in Economic Organizations

Inbunden, Engelska, 1994

AvRobert P. Gilles,Pieter H.M. Ruys

2 149 kr

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Imperfections and Behavior in Economic Organizations analyzes the organization of economic decision making in a contemporary setting. The contributors focus on two important aspects of this analysis. First, they address the issue of imperfect or incomplete information and communication in economic organizations and consider imperfections arising from the interaction of the market organization with its environment. Second, the issue of cooperation in a competitive environment is thoroughly analyzed and alternative social trade organizations are designed to dissipate the allocation problems that arise in these situations.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum1994-07-31
Mått155 x 235 x 23 mm
Vikt670 g
FormatInbunden
SpråkEngelska
SerieTheory and Decision Library C
Antal sidor319
Upplaga1994
FörlagKluwer Academic Publishers
ISBN9780792394594

Tillhör följande kategorier

1 Inherent Imperfection of Economic Organizations.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Characterization of Economic Goods.- 3 Characterization of Economic Allocation Organizations.- 4 Interaction Between Resources and Valuations.- 2 The Kinked Demand Curve, Facilitating Practices, and Oligopolistic Coordination.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Model.- 3 Inadequacy of the Nash Equilibrium Concept.- 4 Sequentially Dominant Strategies.- 5 Two Applications.- 6 Concluding Remarks.- 3 A Revelation Principle for (Boundedly) Bayesian Rationalizable Strategies.- 1 Background.- 2 Commonly Modelled Game Forms.- 3 Bayesian Rationalizable Game Forms.- 4 Implementation.- 5 A Generalized Revelation Principle.- 6 Concentrating upon Intrinsic Types.- 7 Dominant Strategy Incentive Constraints.- 8 Bounded Modelling.- 9 Desirable Extensions.- 10 Conclusion.- 4 Widespread Externalities and Perfectly Competitive Markets: Examples.- 1 Introduction.- 2 An Automobile Market with Pollution; A Pure Public Bad Externality.- 3 The Tragedy of the Commons; Over-Exploitation Caused by Externality and Market Feedback.- 4 An Economy with Conformists and Non-Conformists; a Pure Psychological Externality.- 5 A Housing Market with Neighborhood Effects; Psychological Externalities Create Economic Value.- 6 Conclusion.- 5 Modelling of Economies with Relational Constraints on Coalition Formation.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Coalitionally Structured Economies.- 3 Relationally Structured Economies.- 4 Coalition Formation in Network Economies.- 6 Topologies as Trade Infrastructures.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Links between Traders.- 3 Cost of Contacting and Maximal Trading Groups.- 4 Number and Size of Maximal Trading Groups.- 5 Typologies.- 6 Pre-Infrastructure and Graph Topology.- 7 Demand in a Duopoly with Horizontal Product Differentiation.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Demand Functions.- 3 Rationing Schemes.- 4 Conclusions.- 8 Implementing Strong and Lower Strong Positive Association Social Choice Rules by Social Procedures.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Procedures.- 3 Stable Standards of Behavior.- 4 Strong Positive Association.- 5 Lower Strong Positive Association.- 9 Cooperation and Communication Restrictions: A Survey.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Communication Games and Solution Concepts.- 3 Dividends and Calculation Methods.- 4 Properties of Communication Games.- 5 Strategic Behavior and Endogenous Formation of Communication Links.- 6 Generalizations.- 10 Outline of the Implications of the Cooperative Nature of the Firm.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Basic Model.- 3 Ownership Structures.- 4 Equilibrium Existence Theorem.- 5 Pareto Non-Optimality.- 6 Comparative Economic Systems.- 7 Concluding Remark: Cooperative Processing of Information.- 11 Intersection Theorems on the Unit Simplex and the Simplotope.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Preliminaries.- 3 Intersection Theorems on the Unit Simplex.- 4 Intersection Theorems on the Simplotope.- 12 A Social Power Index for Hierarchically Structured Populations of Economic Agents.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Hierarchically Structured Populations.- 3 Social Power Indices.- 4 A Subjective Approach to the BG-Index.- 5 An Example.

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