Richard Albert has been appointed Professor of Law at Boston College Law School and visiting professor at the University of Toronto, Externado University of Colombia, the Interdisciplinary Center (Herzliya) and Yale University.Xenophon Contiades is Professor of Public Law, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences (Athens, Greece) and Managing Director of the Centre for European Constitutional Law. Alkmene Fotiadou is Research Associate at the Centre for European Constitutional Law.

• Introduction: The State of the Art in Constitutional Amendment Richard AlbertI. Defining the Field II. The Architecture of Constitutional Amendment Rules III. Amendment as Constitution Part I: The Foundations of Constitutional Amendment1. Amendment Power, Constituent Power, and Popular Sovereignty: Linking Unamendability and Amendment ProceduresYaniv RoznaiI. Introduction II. Unamendability and Constituent Power III. The Constitutionalisation of Primary Constituent Power IV. The Spectrum of Constitutional Amendment Powers V. Conclusion 2. Constitutional Theory and Cognitive Estrangement: Beyond Revolutions, Amendments and Constitutional Moments Zoran OklopcicI. Introduction: The Person of ‘The People’ and A Three-Fold Cognitive Estrangement II. Beyond ‘The People’: New Tropes, Old Anxieties III. Three Forms of Estrangement-prevention: Holmes, Pettit, Dworkin IV. Tertium Datur: Mapping Constitutional Change Between the Revolution and the Amendment V. Towards a Different Familiarity: ‘The People’, The Paradox and The Sacrifice 3. Constraints on Constitutional Amendment PowersOran DoyleI. Introduction II. A Doctrine of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments III. Constraint and Powers of Constitutional Change IV. The Types of Constraint on Constitutional Amendment Powers V. Distribution of Power and the Justification of Constraint VI. Justification of Constraints on Constitutional Amendment Powers VII. Conclusion 4. Comment on Doyle’s Constraints on Constitutional Amendment Powers Mark Tushnet5. Constituting the Amendment Power: A Framework for Comparative Amendment LawThomaz PereiraI. Introduction II. Conclusion 6. Sieyès: The Spirit of Constitutional Democracy? Luisa Fernanda García LópezI. Introduction II. Towards a Representative Democracy III. Towards a Constitutional Democracy IV. Conclusion 7. Revolutionary Reform in Venezuela: Electoral Rules and Historical Narratives in the Creation of the 1999 Constitution Joshua BraverI. Introduction II. Carl Schmitt’s Unfortunate Victory over Hannah Arendt in the Analysis of Popular Constitution-Making III. Hannah Arendt’s Revolutionary Reform IV. Hugo Chávez’s Radical and Original Constituent Power V. The Turning Point: The Electoral Rules for the Constituent Assembly VI. Radical Breaks and Exclusionary Mandates VII. Conclusion

Richard Albert has been appointed Professor of Law at Boston College Law School and visiting professor at the University of Toronto, Externado University of Colombia, the Interdisciplinary Center (Herzliya) and Yale University.Xenophon Contiades is Professor of Public Law, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences (Athens, Greece) and Managing Director of the Centre for European Constitutional Law. Alkmene Fotiadou is Research Associate at the Centre for European Constitutional Law.

• Introduction: The State of the Art in Constitutional Amendment Richard AlbertI. Defining the Field II. The Architecture of Constitutional Amendment Rules III. Amendment as Constitution Part I: The Foundations of Constitutional Amendment1. Amendment Power, Constituent Power, and Popular Sovereignty: Linking Unamendability and Amendment ProceduresYaniv RoznaiI. Introduction II. Unamendability and Constituent Power III. The Constitutionalisation of Primary Constituent Power IV. The Spectrum of Constitutional Amendment Powers V. Conclusion 2. Constitutional Theory and Cognitive Estrangement: Beyond Revolutions, Amendments and Constitutional Moments Zoran OklopcicI. Introduction: The Person of ‘The People’ and A Three-Fold Cognitive Estrangement II. Beyond ‘The People’: New Tropes, Old Anxieties III. Three Forms of Estrangement-prevention: Holmes, Pettit, Dworkin IV. Tertium Datur: Mapping Constitutional Change Between the Revolution and the Amendment V. Towards a Different Familiarity: ‘The People’, The Paradox and The Sacrifice 3. Constraints on Constitutional Amendment PowersOran DoyleI. Introduction II. A Doctrine of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments III. Constraint and Powers of Constitutional Change IV. The Types of Constraint on Constitutional Amendment Powers V. Distribution of Power and the Justification of Constraint VI. Justification of Constraints on Constitutional Amendment Powers VII. Conclusion 4. Comment on Doyle’s Constraints on Constitutional Amendment Powers Mark Tushnet5. Constituting the Amendment Power: A Framework for Comparative Amendment LawThomaz PereiraI. Introduction II. Conclusion 6. Sieyès: The Spirit of Constitutional Democracy? Luisa Fernanda García LópezI. Introduction II. Towards a Representative Democracy III. Towards a Constitutional Democracy IV. Conclusion 7. Revolutionary Reform in Venezuela: Electoral Rules and Historical Narratives in the Creation of the 1999 Constitution Joshua BraverI. Introduction II. Carl Schmitt’s Unfortunate Victory over Hannah Arendt in the Analysis of Popular Constitution-Making III. Hannah Arendt’s Revolutionary Reform IV. Hugo Chávez’s Radical and Original Constituent Power V. The Turning Point: The Electoral Rules for the Constituent Assembly VI. Radical Breaks and Exclusionary Mandates VII. Conclusion

Richard Albert has been appointed Professor of Law at Boston College Law School and visiting professor at the University of Toronto, Externado University of Colombia, the Interdisciplinary Center (Herzliya) and Yale University.Xenophon Contiades is Professor of Public Law, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences (Athens, Greece) and Managing Director of the Centre for European Constitutional Law. Alkmene Fotiadou is Research Associate at the Centre for European Constitutional Law.

• Introduction: The State of the Art in Constitutional Amendment Richard AlbertI. Defining the Field II. The Architecture of Constitutional Amendment Rules III. Amendment as Constitution Part I: The Foundations of Constitutional Amendment1. Amendment Power, Constituent Power, and Popular Sovereignty: Linking Unamendability and Amendment ProceduresYaniv RoznaiI. Introduction II. Unamendability and Constituent Power III. The Constitutionalisation of Primary Constituent Power IV. The Spectrum of Constitutional Amendment Powers V. Conclusion 2. Constitutional Theory and Cognitive Estrangement: Beyond Revolutions, Amendments and Constitutional Moments Zoran OklopcicI. Introduction: The Person of ‘The People’ and A Three-Fold Cognitive Estrangement II. Beyond ‘The People’: New Tropes, Old Anxieties III. Three Forms of Estrangement-prevention: Holmes, Pettit, Dworkin IV. Tertium Datur: Mapping Constitutional Change Between the Revolution and the Amendment V. Towards a Different Familiarity: ‘The People’, The Paradox and The Sacrifice 3. Constraints on Constitutional Amendment PowersOran DoyleI. Introduction II. A Doctrine of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments III. Constraint and Powers of Constitutional Change IV. The Types of Constraint on Constitutional Amendment Powers V. Distribution of Power and the Justification of Constraint VI. Justification of Constraints on Constitutional Amendment Powers VII. Conclusion 4. Comment on Doyle’s Constraints on Constitutional Amendment Powers Mark Tushnet5. Constituting the Amendment Power: A Framework for Comparative Amendment LawThomaz PereiraI. Introduction II. Conclusion 6. Sieyès: The Spirit of Constitutional Democracy? Luisa Fernanda García LópezI. Introduction II. Towards a Representative Democracy III. Towards a Constitutional Democracy IV. Conclusion 7. Revolutionary Reform in Venezuela: Electoral Rules and Historical Narratives in the Creation of the 1999 Constitution Joshua BraverI. Introduction II. Carl Schmitt’s Unfortunate Victory over Hannah Arendt in the Analysis of Popular Constitution-Making III. Hannah Arendt’s Revolutionary Reform IV. Hugo Chávez’s Radical and Original Constituent Power V. The Turning Point: The Electoral Rules for the Constituent Assembly VI. Radical Breaks and Exclusionary Mandates VII. Conclusion