Michael Luntley is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Warwick. He is the author of Wittgenstein: Meaning and Judgment (Blackwell, 2003) and Contemporary Philosophy of Thought (Blackwell, 1999) and has published dozens of articles in peer-reviewed journals, including Mind & Language, Analysis, and Philosophical Quarterly.

• Preface ixIntroduction xiiiI.1 Things Unravel – A Snapshot xiiiI.2 Four Key Points xvI.3 Seeing the Text Aright xviiI.4 Opening Methodological Remarks xxiiiI.5 Outline xxviii1 Beginning with §1 11.1 Starting with Augustine 11.2 Three Things in Section 1 41.3 Names are Fundamental 91.4 The Wide Angle View 151.5 From the Augustinian Conception to Language Games 182 Ostensive Definition: The Shape of the Argument 352.1 Introduction 352.2 Ostension and Ostensive Definition 372.3 Two Issues: Metaphysical and Developmental 442.4 Substantive and Commonplace Roles for Ostension 472.5 Wittgenstein’s Use of “Ostensive Definition” 572.6 Wittgenstein on Learning 662.7 Ostensive Definition 743 Linguistic Regularity, Grammar and Autonomy 883.1 Introduction 883.2 Regularity and Grammar – Explanations and Travelogs 893.3 Norms, Fitness, Going Up the Garden Path 953.4 Wittgenstein’s Idealism 983.5 Platitudes – From Bold to Modest Realism 1013.6 Wittgenstein’s Argument 1083.7 Demonstrative Thoughts 1143.8 Closing “Oughts” 1164 Explanations 1254.1 Introduction 1254.2 Three Claims in §109 1274.3 Philosophy can Offer No Explanations 1324.4 Insightful Descriptions 1434.5 The Sense of Fit 152Appendix What Happens to the Private Language Argument? 159Bibliography 170Index 000

“Despite apparently underplaying the importance of the Tractatusin the genesis of the later philosophy, though, Luntley’s book is a very valuable challenge to any complacency we may feel about how to interpret the opening paragraphs of Wittgenstein’s great unfinished masterpiece.”  (Philosophical Quarterly, Advanced Access, 18 December 2016)