Williamson on Knowledge

Patrick Greenough is a senior Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at the University of St. Andrews. His works in the Philosophy of Logic, the Philosophy of Language, and Epistemology. Duncan Pritchard gained his PhD from the University of St. Andrews. His research is mainly in epistemology and he has published widely in this area, including Epistemic Luck (OUP, 2005) and What is this Thing Called Knowledge? (Routledge, 2006). Previously, he was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Stirling; he presently occupies the Chair in Epistemology at the University of Edinburgh.

• Introduction ; 1. E = K and Perceptual Knowledge ; 2. Can the Concept of Knowledge be Analysed? ; 3. Is Knowing a State of Mind? The Case Against ; 4. The Knowledge Account of Assertion and the Nature of Testimonial Knowledge ; 5. Williamson on Knowledge and Evidence ; 6. Knowledge and Objective Chance ; 7. Primeness, Internalism, Explanation ; 8. Williamson's Casual Approach to Probabilism ; 9. Assertion, Knowledge and Lotteries ; 10. Defeating the Dogma of Defeasibility ; 11. Evidence = Knowledge: Williamson's Solution to Skepticism ; 12. Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and its Limits ; 13. Are Mental States Luminous? ; 14. Cognitive Phenomenology, Semantic Qualia and Luminous Knowledge ; 15. Aristotle's Condition ; 16. Reponses to Critics

the volume is an especially valuable epistemological resource: it ushers us toward a deeper understanding of Williamson's epistemology. Here in a single volume are interesting new criticisms of Williamson's views, leveled by some epistemological heavyweights, and novel defenses of those views, defenses in which Williamson often supplements and further develops his earlier contributions. His pioneering work occupies an important place in epistemology, and this volume is a rich and welcome aid to those of us who have an interest in understanding and appreciating Williamson's work.