Why Religious Freedom Matters for Democracy

Myriam Hunter-Henin is Reader in Law and Religion and Comparative Law at University College London.

• 1. Introduction I. Goals of the Book A. The Method of Avoidance B. The Principle of Inclusion C. The Principle of Revision D. The Analogous-to-Secular View E. The Accommodationist View II. Summary of My Main Argument A. Implications for Law B. Implications of My Argument for Theories of Democracy and Legal Pluralism C. A Contextual and Comparative Approach III. Structure of the Argument IV. Conclusion PART ITHE BROKEN VIVRE ENSEMBLE – OBSERVATIONS AND SOLUTIONS2. Contextual Analyses: Laïcité and the Democratic Vivre Ensemble I. The Historical Layers of Laïcité: From Hostility to Tolerance Towards Religion A. Laïcité: A Militant Form of Secularism? B. Laïcité: From Militant to Separatist and Liberal Secularism C. Conclusion to Section I II. Laïcité, Common Values and Islam A. Recent Extensions of Laïcité B. Gilles Kepel’s Laïcité C. Communautarian versus Inclusive Laïcité D. Conclusion to Section II III. Conclusion to Chapter 2 3. Contextual Analyses: The English Experience of Vivre EnsembleI. Church Establishment: An Inclusive Type of Secularism? A. The Possibility of Church Establishment B. English Establishment: An Inclusive Form of Secularism C. Conclusion to Section I II. British Values, Religious Autonomy and Liberalism A. Religious Minorities in England B. The Decline of Religious Autonomy in English Law C. Conclusion to Section II III. Conclusion to Chapter 3 4. Conceptual Framework: The Liberal Democratic Vivre Ensemble I. Why Religious Freedom Matters for Democracy A. The Dilution of Religious Freedom B. The Isolation of Religious Freedom C. Conclusion to Section I II. Why Pluralism Matters for Democracy and Religious Freedom A. Self-restraint, Religious Freedom and Pluralism B. Pluralism, Religious Freedom and Public Reason C. Conclusion to Section II III. Conclusion to Chapter 4 PART IICASE STUDIES: THE MENDED VIVRE ENSEMBLE5. Lessons from Achbita I. Spheres Over PrinciplesA. The Contractual Sphere: The Non-interventionist Ordoliberal Baseline Argument B. The National Sphere: Alleged Deference to the Constitutional Laïque Context C. Conclusion to Section I II. Consistency Over Proportionality A. Introductory: The Eweida Case B. Burdens of the Consistency Argument for Religious Employees’ Claims C. Proportionality Test Reduced Mainly to Procedural Consistency D. Conclusion to Section II III. Conclusion to Chapter 5 6. Beyond Achbita: Possible Ways Forward I. Laïcite: Deference Rather than Delegation A. Ebrahimian: An Extensive Deference to Laïcité B. From Ebrahimian to Achbita: From Deference to Laïcité to Delegation to National Authorities C. Conclusion to Section I II. Proportionality Rather than Autonomy A. The Rejection of the Church Autonomy Argument in Egenberger B. Guidelines from the ECtHR’s Case Law C. Conclusion to Section II III. Religious Freedom and Equality Rights A. Balancing Private Interests in the Context of Legislative Ambiguities B. Balancing Private Interests in a US Context C. Conclusion to Section III IV. Conclusion to Chapter 6 V. Conclusion of Part II 7. Conclusion I. For a Democratic Approach to Religious Freedom A. Comparative Demonstration B. Normative Demonstration II. Consequences of the Democratic Approach for the Courts A. Clues Relating to the Assessment of the Religious Claim B. Against Delegation to Employers C. For a Nuanced Deference to National Traditions D. Comments on Proportionality E. A Word on Brexit

[The book] is of great importance and social and political relevance … The book is pleasant to read, the author's style is clear and the book is very well organized … The thoughts provoked by the book and the theses contained therein testify to the pleasure of reading it as well as the inability to account, at least completely, for the richness of the analysis it contains.