Why It's OK Not to Think for Yourself

Jonathan Matheson is Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Florida. His research interests are in epistemology, with a focus on issues concerning disagreement and epistemic autonomy. He has authored The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement (2015) and co-edited The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social (2014) with Rico Vitz and Epistemic Autonomy (2021) with Kirk Lougheed.

• Chapter 1 IntroductionKeeping your House in OrderWhat is Thinking for Yourself?Clarifying the Central ConclusionLooking AheadChapter 2 Believing (Just) Because Others Believe: Epistemic Surrogates From Individual to Social EpistemologyBelieving the Experts & Epistemic SurrogacyThe Wisdom of CrowdsThe UpshotChapter 3 The Argument from ExpertiseMotivating the Argument Applying the ArgumentAn Initial Worry: Identifying the ExpertsThe UpshotChapter 4 The Argument from Evidential SwampingMotivating the ArgumentApplying the ArgumentThe UpshotChapter 5 The Autonomy ObjectionMotivating the ObjectionThe Myth of Intellectual IndividualismAutonomy as Intellectual FreedomAutonomy as Intellectual VirtueWrap-UpChapter 6 The Free-Rider ObjectionMotivating the Objection The Cognitive Division of Labor Epistemic Trespassing The Wisdom of Crowds Again Wrap-UpChapter 7 The Socratic ObjectionMotivating the ObjectionNormative QuestionsNo Relevant ExpertsThe Importance of Getting it RightMoral VirtueIn Favor of Socratic DeferenceWrap-UpChapter 8 The Vulnerability Objection Motivating the Objection The Inevitability of VulnerabilityVulnerability and Checks & BalancesThe Importance of InstitutionsWrap-UpChapter 9 The Understanding ObjectionMotivating the ObjectionUnderstanding Without Thinking for YourselfSetting the ScopeEpistemic SatisficingWrap-UpChapter 10 The Intellectual Virtue ObjectionMotivating the ObjectionCultivating Intellectual Character Through DeferenceCartesian Epistemology & Social EpistemologySocial Intellectual VirtuesWrap-Up