When Leaders Learn and When They Don't

Akan Malici is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Furman University.

• List of Tables and FiguresAcknowledgmentsTHE ARGUMENT 1. Political Leadership and the Puzzle of Foreign Policy Change and ContinuityMikhail Gorbachev and Kim Il SungThe Decision-Making ApproachBeliefs and Strategic InteractionOutline of the Book2. A Theory of Foreign Policy DecisionsThe Theory of Moves (TOM)Preferences Need InferencesMaking Beliefs and Learning Patterns VisibleThe Theory of Inferences about Preferences (TIP)The Subjective Games of Gorbachev's Predecessors (1980-1985)THE CASES 3.Gorbachev: Uncommitted Thinker and Motivated LearnerThe Early Gorbachev Era (1985-1986)The Second Year of the Gorbachev Era (February 1986 - January 1987) 4. Gorbachev: Committed Teacher and ReformerGorbachev Induces U.S. Cooperation (1987-1988)Gorbachev Transforms Great Power Politics (1989-1991)5. Kim Il Sung: Revolutionary Cold WarriorDeadlock in the Cold War (1980-1983)The Deadlock Continues (1984-1986)6. Kim Il Sung: Touched by the Winds of Change?The Catalytic Period (1987-1990)The Post-Cold War Period (1991-1994)THE IMPLICATIONS 7. Lessons from the Past and Applications to the FutureMain FindingsTheoretical SignificanceThe Continued Relevance of Gorbachev and Kim Il SungNotesBibliographyIndex

"…a highly intelligent book based on the rigorous use of mathematical and linguistic tools." — Central European Journal of International & Security Studies"This book makes an important contribution in highlighting the importance of political leadership. It stands in opposition to more deterministic treatments that would say things 'had to happen' in a certain manner. The comparison of Gorbachev and Kim Il Sung brings out the great potential for variation in what a regime does depending upon the presence or absence of learning among top leadership. As an effort to bring together the cognitive and rational choice approaches, this book is among the best I have seen." — Patrick James, author of International Relations and Scientific Progress: Structural Realism Reconsidered