Gary Steiner is Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at Bucknell University.

• IntroductionChapter One: Background Ideals of Living1. A Counterintuitive Idea2. Background Ideals of Living in the Philosophical Tradition3. Anthropocentric Implications of Some Contemporary Approaches 4. Anthropocentric and Non-Anthropocentric Background Ideals of LivingChapter Two: The Essential Role and Pitfalls of Reason in Moral Judgment1. Background Ideals of Living and Our Basic Understanding of Reason2. Two Early Exponents of Anthropocentric Rationality: Aristotle and Seneca 3. The Enlightenment's Chief Exponent of Anthropocentric Rationality: Kant 4. Questioning the Traditional Commitment to the Primacy of ReasonChapter Three: Historical Idealism and the Process of Critical Reflection1. Rationality: Rethink or Reject? 2. Rorty's Challenge to Reason and Criteria 3. The Ideal of Critical Detachment Revisited 4. Ortega's Turn to Historical Reason 5. Miller's Actualism and the Problem of Universals 6. A Concluding ThoughtChapter Four: The Affective Dimension of Moral Commitment1. Background Ideals of Living and the Putative Autonomy of Reason2. A Positive Path Beyond the Limits of Reason?3. Reclaiming a Guiding Place for the Emotions 4. Pre-Predicative Meaning and Affective Engagement 5. The Moral Community is Neither Exclusively Nor Primarily Human Chapter Five: Felt Kinship: The Essential Tension Between Local and Global Commitments1. The Power and Essential Limits of Reason 2. The Power and Essential Limits of Feeling or Emotion 3. Toward a Dialectical Conception of the Reason-Emotion Dichotomy 4. Toward a Well-Tempered HumanismBibliography

Gary Steiner is Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at Bucknell University.

• IntroductionChapter One: Background Ideals of Living1. A Counterintuitive Idea2. Background Ideals of Living in the Philosophical Tradition3. Anthropocentric Implications of Some Contemporary Approaches 4. Anthropocentric and Non-Anthropocentric Background Ideals of LivingChapter Two: The Essential Role and Pitfalls of Reason in Moral Judgment1. Background Ideals of Living and Our Basic Understanding of Reason2. Two Early Exponents of Anthropocentric Rationality: Aristotle and Seneca 3. The Enlightenment's Chief Exponent of Anthropocentric Rationality: Kant 4. Questioning the Traditional Commitment to the Primacy of ReasonChapter Three: Historical Idealism and the Process of Critical Reflection1. Rationality: Rethink or Reject? 2. Rorty's Challenge to Reason and Criteria 3. The Ideal of Critical Detachment Revisited 4. Ortega's Turn to Historical Reason 5. Miller's Actualism and the Problem of Universals 6. A Concluding ThoughtChapter Four: The Affective Dimension of Moral Commitment1. Background Ideals of Living and the Putative Autonomy of Reason2. A Positive Path Beyond the Limits of Reason?3. Reclaiming a Guiding Place for the Emotions 4. Pre-Predicative Meaning and Affective Engagement 5. The Moral Community is Neither Exclusively Nor Primarily Human Chapter Five: Felt Kinship: The Essential Tension Between Local and Global Commitments1. The Power and Essential Limits of Reason 2. The Power and Essential Limits of Feeling or Emotion 3. Toward a Dialectical Conception of the Reason-Emotion Dichotomy 4. Toward a Well-Tempered HumanismBibliography

Gary Steiner is Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at Bucknell University.

• IntroductionChapter One: Background Ideals of Living1. A Counterintuitive Idea2. Background Ideals of Living in the Philosophical Tradition3. Anthropocentric Implications of Some Contemporary Approaches 4. Anthropocentric and Non-Anthropocentric Background Ideals of LivingChapter Two: The Essential Role and Pitfalls of Reason in Moral Judgment1. Background Ideals of Living and Our Basic Understanding of Reason2. Two Early Exponents of Anthropocentric Rationality: Aristotle and Seneca 3. The Enlightenment's Chief Exponent of Anthropocentric Rationality: Kant 4. Questioning the Traditional Commitment to the Primacy of ReasonChapter Three: Historical Idealism and the Process of Critical Reflection1. Rationality: Rethink or Reject? 2. Rorty's Challenge to Reason and Criteria 3. The Ideal of Critical Detachment Revisited 4. Ortega's Turn to Historical Reason 5. Miller's Actualism and the Problem of Universals 6. A Concluding ThoughtChapter Four: The Affective Dimension of Moral Commitment1. Background Ideals of Living and the Putative Autonomy of Reason2. A Positive Path Beyond the Limits of Reason?3. Reclaiming a Guiding Place for the Emotions 4. Pre-Predicative Meaning and Affective Engagement 5. The Moral Community is Neither Exclusively Nor Primarily Human Chapter Five: Felt Kinship: The Essential Tension Between Local and Global Commitments1. The Power and Essential Limits of Reason 2. The Power and Essential Limits of Feeling or Emotion 3. Toward a Dialectical Conception of the Reason-Emotion Dichotomy 4. Toward a Well-Tempered HumanismBibliography