Value Theory

Inbunden, Engelska, 2015

AvFrancesco Orsi,Simon Kirchin

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What is it for a car, a piece of art or a person to be good, bad or better than another? In this first book-length introduction to value theory, Francesco Orsi explores the nature of evaluative concepts used in everyday thinking and speech and in contemporary philosophical discourse. The various dimensions, structures and connections that value concepts express are interrogated with clarity and incision. Orsi provides a systematic survey of both classic texts including Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Moore and Ross and an array of contemporary theorists. The reader is guided through the moral maze of value theory with everyday examples and thought experiments. Rare stamps, Napoleon's hat, evil demons, and Kant's good will are all considered in order to probe our intuitions, question our own and philosophers' assumptions about value, and, ultimately, understand better what we want to say when we talk about value.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2015-01-29
Mått138 x 216 x 14 mm
Vikt363 g
FormatInbunden
SpråkEngelska
SerieBloomsbury Ethics
Antal sidor184
FörlagBloomsbury Publishing PLC
ISBN9781472530882

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1. Value and Normativity1.1 Introduction1.2 Which Evaluations?1.3 The Idea of Value Theory1.4 Value and Normativity1.5 Overview1.6 Meta-ethical Neutrality1.7 Value Theory: The Questions2. Meet the Values: Intrinsic, Final & Co.2.1 Introduction2.2 Final and Unconditional Value: Some Philosophical Examples2.3 Intrinsic Value and Final Value2.4 The Reduction to Facts2.5 Intrinsic and Conditional Value2.6 Elimination of Extrinsic Value?2.7 Summary3. The Challenge against Absolute Value3.1 Introduction3.2 Geach and Attributive Goodness3.3 Foot and the Virtues3.4 Thomson and Goodness in a Way3.5 Zimmerman’s Ethical Goodness3.6 A Better Reply: Absolute Value and Fitting Attitudes3.7 Summary4. Personal Value4.1 Introduction4.2 Moore on Good and Good For4.3 Good For and Fitting Attitudes4.4 Moore Strikes Back?4.5 Agent-relative Value4.6 Impersonal/Personal and Agent-neutral/Agent-relative4.7 Summary5. The Chemistry of Value5.1 Introduction5.2 Supervenience and Other Relations5.3 Organic Unities5.4 Alternatives to Organic Unities: Virtual Value5.5 Alternatives to Organic Unities: Conditional Value5.6 Holism and Particularism5.7 Summary6. Value Relations6.1 Introduction6.2 The Trichotomy Thesis and Incomparability6.3 A Fitting Attitude Argument for Incomparability6.4 Against Incomparability: Epistemic Limitations6.5 Against Incomparability: Parity6.6 Parity and Choice6.7 Parity and Incomparability6.8 Summary7. How Do I Favour Thee?7.1 Introduction7.2 Three Dimensions of Favouring7.3 Responses to Value: Maximizing7.4 Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value?7.5 Summary8. Value and the Wrong Kind of Reasons8.1 Introduction8.2 The Fitting Attitude Account and its Rivals8.3 The Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem8.4 The Structure of the Problem and an Initial Response8.5 Reasons for What?8.6 Characteristic Concerns and Shared Reasons8.7 Circular Path: No-Priority8.8 Summary