Trust

Edited by Elias L. Khalil, Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, Doha, Qatar

• Contents:AcknowledgementsIntroduction Why Does Trustworthiness Pay? Three Answers Elias L. KhalilPART ITRUST AS STRATEGY 1. Gordon Tullock (1985), ‘Adam Smith and the Prisoners’ Dilemma’2. Robert Axelrod and Douglas Dion (1988), ‘The Further Evolution of Cooperation’3. Jack Hirshleifer (1999), ‘There are Many Evolutionary Pathways to Cooperation’4. Oliver E. Williamson (1983), ‘Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange’5. David M. Kreps, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts and Robert Wilson (1982), ‘Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma’6. John Gale, Kenneth G. Binmore and Larry Samuelson (1995), ‘Learning to Be Imperfect: The Ultimatum Game’7. Edward H. Lorenz (1988), ‘Neither Friends nor Strangers: Informal Networks of Subcontracting in French Industry’8. Keith Hart (1988), ‘Kinship, Contract, and Trust: The Economic Organization of Migrants in an African City Slum’9. Peter Kollock (1994), ‘The Emergence of Exchange Structures: An Experimental Study of Uncertainty, Commitment, and Trust’10. Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom and Barry R. Weingast (1994), ‘Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild’11. Oliver E. Williamson (1993), ‘Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization’12. Bart Nooteboom (1996), ‘Trust, Opportunism and Governance: A Process and Control Model’13. Bernd Lahno (2001), ‘On the Emotional Character of Trust’PART IITRUST AS TASTE 14. Ernst Fehr and Simon Gächter (2000), ‘Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity’15. Werner Güth and Reinhard Tietz (1990), ‘Ultimatum Bargaining Behavior: A Survey and Comparison of Experimental Results’16. Alvin E. Roth, Vesna Prasnikar, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Shmuel Zamir (1991), ‘Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study’17. Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis and Richard McElreath (2001), ‘In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies’18. James Andreoni (1988), ‘Why Free Ride? Strategies and Learning in Public Goods Experiments’19. Richard H. Thaler with Robyn M. Dawes (1992), ‘Cooperation’20. Joyce Berg, John Dickhaut and Kevin McCabe (1995), ‘Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History’21. Andreas Ortmann, John Fitzgerald and Carl Boeing (2000), ‘Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History: A Re-examination’22. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard Thaler (1986), ‘Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market’23. George A. Akerlof (1982), ‘Labor Contracts as a Partial Gift Exchange’24. Matthew Rabin (1993), ‘Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics’25. David K. Levine (1998), ‘Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments’26. Amitai Etzioni (1986), ‘The Case for a Multiple-Utility Conception’27. Amartya K. Sen (1977), ‘Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory’28. Elias L. Khalil (1999), ‘Sentimental Fools: A Critique of Amartya Sen’s Notion of Commitment’PART IIITRUST AS TRAIT 29. Ulrich Witt (1986), ‘Evolution and Stability of Cooperation without Enforceable Contracts’30. Werner Güth, Hartmut Kliemt and Bezalel Peleg (2000), ‘Co-evolution of Preferences and Information in Simple Games of Trust’31. Werner Güth and Menahem E. Yaari (1992), ‘Explaining Reciprocal Behavior in Simple Strategic Games: An Evolutionary Approach’32. Herbert Gintis (2000), ‘Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality’33. Robert H. Frank (1987), ‘If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience?’34. Jack Hirshleifer (1987), ‘On the Emotions as Guarantors of Threats and Promises’35. Jörn P.W. Scharlemann, Catherine C. Eckel, Alex Kacelnik and Rick K. Wilson (2001), ‘The Value of a Smile: Game Theory with a Human Face’36. Axel Ockenfels and Reinhard Selten (2000), ‘An Experiment on the Hypothesis of Involuntary Truth-Signalling in Bargaining’Name Index

'It is big, diverse and, through its organization coherent. This truly is an encyclopedia of trust research. . . warmly recommended.'