Del 3 - Critical Studies in Economic Institutions series

Trust

Inbunden, Engelska, 2003

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Trust is an authoritative collection of previously published articles and is unique in the growing literature on trustworthiness. The broad ranging articles are organized into three parts, expressing three definite answers to the question posed in the introduction: Why does trustworthiness pay? Part I, 'Trust as Strategy', stipulates that trust is an investment in reputation. Part II, 'Trust as Taste', argues that agents have a preference for trustworthiness, which may explain the anomaly of trustworthiness in single-shot games. Part III, 'Trust as Trait', maintains that trust is a trait that evolutionary selection may favor. In his extensive introductory essay, Elias Khalil elaborates and contrasts the strengths and weaknesses of each answer.Including over 35 articles from diverse disciplines such as economics, sociology, political science, anthropology, philosophy, psychology, evolutionary biology, and organizational studies, Trust will be a valuable reference for many years to come.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2003-05-28
FormatInbunden
SpråkEngelska
SerieCritical Studies in Economic Institutions series
FörlagEdward Elgar Publishing Ltd
ISBN9781840647372

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Contents:AcknowledgementsIntroduction Why Does Trustworthiness Pay? Three Answers Elias L. KhalilPART ITRUST AS STRATEGY 1. Gordon Tullock (1985), ‘Adam Smith and the Prisoners’ Dilemma’2. Robert Axelrod and Douglas Dion (1988), ‘The Further Evolution of Cooperation’3. Jack Hirshleifer (1999), ‘There are Many Evolutionary Pathways to Cooperation’4. Oliver E. Williamson (1983), ‘Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange’5. David M. Kreps, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts and Robert Wilson (1982), ‘Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma’6. John Gale, Kenneth G. Binmore and Larry Samuelson (1995), ‘Learning to Be Imperfect: The Ultimatum Game’7. Edward H. Lorenz (1988), ‘Neither Friends nor Strangers: Informal Networks of Subcontracting in French Industry’8. Keith Hart (1988), ‘Kinship, Contract, and Trust: The Economic Organization of Migrants in an African City Slum’9. Peter Kollock (1994), ‘The Emergence of Exchange Structures: An Experimental Study of Uncertainty, Commitment, and Trust’10. Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom and Barry R. Weingast (1994), ‘Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild’11. Oliver E. Williamson (1993), ‘Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization’12. Bart Nooteboom (1996), ‘Trust, Opportunism and Governance: A Process and Control Model’13. Bernd Lahno (2001), ‘On the Emotional Character of Trust’PART IITRUST AS TASTE 14. Ernst Fehr and Simon Gächter (2000), ‘Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity’15. Werner Güth and Reinhard Tietz (1990), ‘Ultimatum Bargaining Behavior: A Survey and Comparison of Experimental Results’16. Alvin E. Roth, Vesna Prasnikar, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Shmuel Zamir (1991), ‘Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study’17. Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis and Richard McElreath (2001), ‘In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies’18. James Andreoni (1988), ‘Why Free Ride? Strategies and Learning in Public Goods Experiments’19. Richard H. Thaler with Robyn M. Dawes (1992), ‘Cooperation’20. Joyce Berg, John Dickhaut and Kevin McCabe (1995), ‘Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History’21. Andreas Ortmann, John Fitzgerald and Carl Boeing (2000), ‘Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History: A Re-examination’22. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard Thaler (1986), ‘Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market’23. George A. Akerlof (1982), ‘Labor Contracts as a Partial Gift Exchange’24. Matthew Rabin (1993), ‘Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics’25. David K. Levine (1998), ‘Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments’26. Amitai Etzioni (1986), ‘The Case for a Multiple-Utility Conception’27. Amartya K. Sen (1977), ‘Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory’28. Elias L. Khalil (1999), ‘Sentimental Fools: A Critique of Amartya Sen’s Notion of Commitment’PART IIITRUST AS TRAIT 29. Ulrich Witt (1986), ‘Evolution and Stability of Cooperation without Enforceable Contracts’30. Werner Güth, Hartmut Kliemt and Bezalel Peleg (2000), ‘Co-evolution of Preferences and Information in Simple Games of Trust’31. Werner Güth and Menahem E. Yaari (1992), ‘Explaining Reciprocal Behavior in Simple Strategic Games: An Evolutionary Approach’32. Herbert Gintis (2000), ‘Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality’33. Robert H. Frank (1987), ‘If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience?’34. Jack Hirshleifer (1987), ‘On the Emotions as Guarantors of Threats and Promises’35. Jörn P.W. Scharlemann, Catherine C. Eckel, Alex Kacelnik and Rick K. Wilson (2001), ‘The Value of a Smile: Game Theory with a Human Face’36. Axel Ockenfels and Reinhard Selten (2000), ‘An Experiment on the Hypothesis of Involuntary Truth-Signalling in Bargaining’Name Index