Robert E. Mullins, previously a Researcher in War Studies at King’s College, University of London, UK, is currently Executive Vice President for Corporate Strategy and Mergers & Acquisitions at Cobham plc, UK.John Beeler is Professor of History at the University of Alabama, USA, where he has worked since 1993.  His publications include British Naval Policy in the Gladstone-Disraeli Era, 1860-1880 (1997); Imperial Defence, 1868-1887 (2014); The Birth of the Battleship: British Capital Ship Design, 1870-1881 (2001), and The Milne Papers, Volumes 1 and 2 (2004, 2015).

• Editor’s introduction.- PART I: OVERVIEW.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Explaining strategic choices in military institutions: theoretical models.- PART II: THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF BRITISH NAVAL POLICY, 1870-1889.- 3. The royal navy and the 1889 naval defence act: history and historiography.- 4. Ideas and institutions: the development of officer education, strategic thinking, and intelligence collection in the royal navy, 1870-1888.- 5. Professionals, politicians, the press, and the public: the “navy scare” of 1888-1889.- PART III: STRATEGIC RECONFIGURATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1873-1889.- 6. British ideas in an American context: the underpinnings of strategic debate and organizational maturity, 1873-1884.- 7. The navalist triumph: politicians, professionals, and the fight for the direction of American naval policy, 1885-1889.- PART IV.- 8. Conclusion.

Robert E. Mullins, previously a Researcher in War Studies at King’s College, University of London, UK, is currently Executive Vice President for Corporate Strategy and Mergers & Acquisitions at Cobham plc, UK.John Beeler is Professor of History at the University of Alabama, USA, where he has worked since 1993.  His publications include British Naval Policy in the Gladstone-Disraeli Era, 1860-1880 (1997); Imperial Defence, 1868-1887 (2014); The Birth of the Battleship: British Capital Ship Design, 1870-1881 (2001), and The Milne Papers, Volumes 1 and 2 (2004, 2015).

• Editor’s introduction.- PART I: OVERVIEW.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Explaining strategic choices in military institutions: theoretical models.- PART II: THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF BRITISH NAVAL POLICY, 1870-1889.- 3. The royal navy and the 1889 naval defence act: history and historiography.- 4. Ideas and institutions: the development of officer education, strategic thinking, and intelligence collection in the royal navy, 1870-1888.- 5. Professionals, politicians, the press, and the public: the “navy scare” of 1888-1889.- PART III: STRATEGIC RECONFIGURATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1873-1889.- 6. British ideas in an American context: the underpinnings of strategic debate and organizational maturity, 1873-1884.- 7. The navalist triumph: politicians, professionals, and the fight for the direction of American naval policy, 1885-1889.- PART IV.- 8. Conclusion.

Robert E. Mullins, previously a Researcher in War Studies at King’s College, University of London, UK, is currently Executive Vice President for Corporate Strategy and Mergers & Acquisitions at Cobham plc, UK.John Beeler is Professor of History at the University of Alabama, USA, where he has worked since 1993.  His publications include British Naval Policy in the Gladstone-Disraeli Era, 1860-1880 (1997); Imperial Defence, 1868-1887 (2014); The Birth of the Battleship: British Capital Ship Design, 1870-1881 (2001), and The Milne Papers, Volumes 1 and 2 (2004, 2015).

• Editor’s introduction.- PART I: OVERVIEW.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Explaining strategic choices in military institutions: theoretical models.- PART II: THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF BRITISH NAVAL POLICY, 1870-1889.- 3. The royal navy and the 1889 naval defence act: history and historiography.- 4. Ideas and institutions: the development of officer education, strategic thinking, and intelligence collection in the royal navy, 1870-1888.- 5. Professionals, politicians, the press, and the public: the “navy scare” of 1888-1889.- PART III: STRATEGIC RECONFIGURATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1873-1889.- 6. British ideas in an American context: the underpinnings of strategic debate and organizational maturity, 1873-1884.- 7. The navalist triumph: politicians, professionals, and the fight for the direction of American naval policy, 1885-1889.- PART IV.- 8. Conclusion.