Transaction Cost Economics Project

The late Oliver E. Williamson, formerly Professor, Graduate School and Edgar F. Kaiser Professor Emeritus of Business, Economics, and Law, University of California, Berkeley, US and 2009 Winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics for Studies of Economic Governance

• Contents:AcknowledgementsIntroduction Oliver Williamson PART I THEORY AND CONCEPTS 1. O.E. Williamson (2001), ‘Hierarchies and Markets’2. Oliver E. Williamson (1971), ‘The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations’3. Oliver E. Williamson (1979), ‘Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations’ 4. Oliver E. Williamson (1983), ‘Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange’5. Oliver E. Williamson (1991), ‘Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives’6. Oliver E. Williamson (1985), ‘The Limits of Firms: Incentive and Bureaucratic Features’7. Oliver E. Williamson (1991), ‘Strategizing, Economizing, and Economic Organization’ PART II PUBLIC POLICY 8. Oliver E. Williamson (1976), ‘Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies – in General and with Respect to CATV’9. Oliver E. Williamson (2009), ‘Opening the Black Box of Firm and Market Organization: Antitrust’10. Oliver E. Williamson (1988), ‘Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance’11. Oliver E. Williamson (2008), ‘Corporate Boards of Directors: In Principle and in Practice’PART III INTERDISCIPLINARY SOCIAL SCIENCE 12. Oliver E. Williamson (1993), ‘Transaction Cost Economics and Organization Theory’13. Oliver E. Williamson (1993), ‘Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization’14. Oliver E. Williamson (2005), ‘Why Law, Economics, and Organization?’ PART IV PERSPECTIVES 15. Oliver E. Williamson (2009), ‘Pragmatic Methodology: A Sketch, with Applications to Transaction Cost Economics’16. Oliver E. Williamson (2010), ‘Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural Progression’

‘The presence of transaction costs greatly modifies the traditional picture of the allocation of resources through the market. It gives rise to many phenomena inexplicable in the simple market view and to problems of government policy. Oliver Williamson has been a leading figure in this analysis. His interpretations of corporate governance and of the complementarity between internal controls and the market have been the most profound in the literature. It is good that his leading essays are now available in collected form.’