Torture and Dignity

An Essay on Moral Injury

Häftad, Engelska, 2020

AvJ. M. Bernstein

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In this unflinching look at the experience of suffering and one of its greatest manifestations—torture—J. M. Bernstein critiques the repressions of traditional moral theory, showing that our morals are not immutable ideals but fragile constructions that depend on our experience of suffering itself. Morals, Bernstein argues, not only guide our conduct but also express the depth of mutual dependence that we share as vulnerable and injurable individuals. Beginning with the attempts to abolish torture in the eighteenth century, and then sensitively examining what is suffered in torture and related transgressions, such as rape, Bernstein elaborates a powerful new conception of moral injury. Crucially, he shows, moral injury always involves an injury to the status of an individual as a person—it is a violent assault against his or her dignity. Elaborating on this critical element of moral injury, he demonstrates that the mutual recognitions of trust form the invisible substance of our moral lives, that dignity is a fragile social possession, and that the perspective of ourselves as potential victims is an ineliminable feature of everyday moral experience.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2020-07-08
Mått152 x 229 x 22 mm
Vikt572 g
FormatHäftad
SpråkEngelska
Antal sidor392
FörlagThe University of Chicago Press
ISBN9780226708874

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AcknowledgmentsIntroductionPart One : History, Phenomenology, and Moral AnalysisOne / Abolishing Torture and the Uprising of the Rule of LawI. IntroductionII. Abolishing Torture: The Dignity of Tormentable BodiesIII. Torture and the Rule of Law: BeccariaIV. The Beccaria ThesisV. Forgetting BeccariaTwo / On Being TorturedI. IntroductionII. Pain: Certainty and SeparatenessIII. Améry’s TortureIV. Pain’s AversivenessV. Pain: Feeling or Reason?VI. Sovereignty: Pain and the OtherVII. Without Borders: Loss of Trust in the WorldThree / The Harm of Rape, The Harm of TortureI. Introduction: Rape and/as TortureII. Moral Injury as AppearanceIII. Moral Injury as Actual: Bodily PersonsIV. On Being RapedV. Exploiting the Moral Ontology of the Body: RapeVI. Exploiting the Moral Ontology of the Body: TorturePart Two : Constructing Moral DignityFour / To Be Is to Live, to Be Is to Be RecognizedI. IntroductionII. To Be Is to Be RecognizedIII. Risk and the Necessity of Life for Self-ConsciousnessIV. Being and Having a BodyV. From Life to RecognitionFive / Trust as Mutual RecognitionI. IntroductionII. The Necessity, Pervasiveness, and Invisibility of TrustIII. Trust’s Priority over ReasonIV. Trust in a Developmental SettingV. On First Love: Trust as the Recognition of Intrinsic WorthSix / “My Body . . . My Physical and Metaphysical Dignity”I. Why Dignity?II. From Nuremberg to Treblinka: The Fate of the UnlovableIII. Without Rights, without Dignity: From Humiliation to DevastationIV. Dignity and the Human FormV. The Body without DignityVI. My Body: Voluntary and InvoluntaryVII. Bodily Revolt: Respect, Self-Respect, and DignityConcluding Remarks : On Moral AlienationI. The Abolition of Torture and Utilitarian FantasiesII. Moral Alienation and the Persistence of RapeNotesIndex