Thomas Reid and the Defence of Duty

James J.S. Foster is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Theology and Director of the Honors Program at the University of Sioux Falls. His previously published two edited volumes, Scottish Philosophy in America (Imprint Academic, 2012) and Thomas Reid on Religion (Imprint Academic, 2017). He is also the editor of the Journal of Scottish Philosophy.

• PrefaceSeries Editor's IntroductionPart I: Reid’s Rejection of Moral SubjectivismChapter 1. Reid’s Way of PhilosophyChapter 2. Reid, Perception and Common SenseChapter 3. Reid’s Arguments against Moral SubjectivityPart II: Reid’s Account of DutyChapter 4. Defining DutyChapter 5. Moral PerceptionChapter 6. Moral MotivationPart III: Objections to Reid’s AccountChapter 7. The Argument from StrangenessChapter 8. The Argument from RelativityChapter 9. The Argument from InterminabilityConclusion: The Practical Implications of Reid’s Defence of DutyWorks CitedIndex

The central thesis of James Foster's Thomas Reid and the Defence of Duty is that Reid was mostly right — and Hume mostly wrong — about the nature of right and wrong. Anyone who dogmatically denies the objectivity of moral distinctions ought to read Foster’s book; it is lucid, lively and wise.