James P. Kahan The Rand Corporation, Amnon Rapoport University of North Carolina and the University of Haifa.

• Preface, 1. PROLEGOMENA, 2. THE LANGUAGE OF COOPERATIVE n-PERSON GAMES, 3. TWO CLASSICAL THEORIES: THE CORE AND THE STABLE SET, 4. BARGAINING SETS, 5. POWER BARGAINING SETS, 6. EXCESS THEORIES, 7. THE SHAPLEY VALUE, 8. SIMPLE GAMES (I): INTERPERSONAL CONTROL THEORIES, 9. SIMPLE GAMES (II): EQUITY THEORIES, 10. BARGAINING PROCESS MODELS, 11. PARADIGMS FOR EXPERIMENTAL GAMES, 12. EXPERIMENTAL GAMES: 3-PERSON QUOTA GAMES, 13. OTHER EXPERIMENTAL GAMES, 14. CONCLUDING REMARKS, REFERENCES, AUTHOR INDEX, SUBJECT INDEX

"...provides the most thorough and ambitious survey of theory and empirical evidence in the field of multi-person cooperative game theory....There is no other text that I know of that will provide mathematically competent social psychologists with a more thorough grounding in this fascinating branch of multi-person game theory."—British Journal of Social Psychology

James P. Kahan The Rand Corporation, Amnon Rapoport University of North Carolina and the University of Haifa.

• Preface, 1. PROLEGOMENA, 2. THE LANGUAGE OF COOPERATIVE n-PERSON GAMES, 3. TWO CLASSICAL THEORIES: THE CORE AND THE STABLE SET, 4. BARGAINING SETS, 5. POWER BARGAINING SETS, 6. EXCESS THEORIES, 7. THE SHAPLEY VALUE, 8. SIMPLE GAMES (I): INTERPERSONAL CONTROL THEORIES, 9. SIMPLE GAMES (II): EQUITY THEORIES, 10. BARGAINING PROCESS MODELS, 11. PARADIGMS FOR EXPERIMENTAL GAMES, 12. EXPERIMENTAL GAMES: 3-PERSON QUOTA GAMES, 13. OTHER EXPERIMENTAL GAMES, 14. CONCLUDING REMARKS, REFERENCES, AUTHOR INDEX, SUBJECT INDEX

"...provides the most thorough and ambitious survey of theory and empirical evidence in the field of multi-person cooperative game theory....There is no other text that I know of that will provide mathematically competent social psychologists with a more thorough grounding in this fascinating branch of multi-person game theory."—British Journal of Social Psychology

James P. Kahan The Rand Corporation, Amnon Rapoport University of North Carolina and the University of Haifa.

• Preface, 1. PROLEGOMENA, 2. THE LANGUAGE OF COOPERATIVE n-PERSON GAMES, 3. TWO CLASSICAL THEORIES: THE CORE AND THE STABLE SET, 4. BARGAINING SETS, 5. POWER BARGAINING SETS, 6. EXCESS THEORIES, 7. THE SHAPLEY VALUE, 8. SIMPLE GAMES (I): INTERPERSONAL CONTROL THEORIES, 9. SIMPLE GAMES (II): EQUITY THEORIES, 10. BARGAINING PROCESS MODELS, 11. PARADIGMS FOR EXPERIMENTAL GAMES, 12. EXPERIMENTAL GAMES: 3-PERSON QUOTA GAMES, 13. OTHER EXPERIMENTAL GAMES, 14. CONCLUDING REMARKS, REFERENCES, AUTHOR INDEX, SUBJECT INDEX

"...provides the most thorough and ambitious survey of theory and empirical evidence in the field of multi-person cooperative game theory....There is no other text that I know of that will provide mathematically competent social psychologists with a more thorough grounding in this fascinating branch of multi-person game theory."—British Journal of Social Psychology