The Value of Living Well

Mark LeBar was educated at the University of Arizona and has been teaching philosophy at Ohio University in Athens, Ohio since 1999.

• Introduction ; Part One ; I. Aristotle on Ends ; I.1 Human life and agency ; I.2 Ends ; I.2.1 Ends as constraints ; I.2.2 Ends, reasons, and <"for the sake of which>" ; I.3 The Aristotelian framework ; I.4 Unhelpful friends ; I.5 Scanlon ; II. Challenges to the Structure ; II.1 No Ultimate End ; II.2 Long-chains views ; II.3 The looping model ; II.4 The real challenge to the Aristotelian framework ; II.5 Pseudo pluralism ; II.6 Political pluralism ; II.7 Telic pluralism ; II.8 What the failure of telic pluralism teaches us ; II.9 Relative monism ; III. Living Well ; III.1 Ancient argument about our Ultimate End ; III.2 Begin with agency ; III.2.1 Subordinating patiency ; III.3 First nature ; III.4 Second nature ; III.5 The VE proposal ; IV. Succeeding as Rational and Social Animals ; IV.1 The contribution of rationality ; IV.1.1 End-setting ; IV.1.2 Judgment in action ; IV.1.3 Training the passions ; IV.2 Sociality ; IV.2.1 Sociality and shared ends ; IV.2.2 Caring for others ; IV.2.3 The agent-relativity of welfare and care ; IV.2.4 Living well in community ; IV.3 Individual difference ; IV.4 Autonomy ; IV.5 Objections ; IV.5.1 Misconceptions ; IV.5.2 Virtue's commitments ; Part Two ; V. Constructivism ; V.1 Motivation for the approach ; V.2 Taxonomy: Constructivism and realism ; V.3 Recognitionalism: Evidence for and against ; V.3.1 Rational recognition ; V.3.2 Reversal of values and conditional value ; V.3.2.1 RV and CV in Plato ; V.3.2.2 RV and CV in the Stoics and Aristotle ; V.3.2.3 Constructivism in Aristotle: the Doctrine of the Mean ; V.3.3 VR reconsidered ; V.3.4 The constructed value of unconditional goods ; V.4 Practical rationality, agency and activity ; V.4.1 Background: realism ; V.4.2 Action guidance ; V.4.3 The failure of recognitionalism ; V.4.4 Naturalism ; V.5 Particularism and recognitionalism ; VI. General and Particular ; VI.1 The basic argument ; VI.2 The problem in Kant ; VI.2.1 The problem in Korsgaard ; VI.2.2 The problem in Herman ; VI.2.3 The problem in O'Neill ; VI.3 The problem for generalist Constructivism ; VI.4 Recognitionalist Particularism ; VII. Fitting Judgment ; VII.1 First-person, third-person ; VII.1.1 Case in point ; VII.2 Constructivism particularism - an overview ; VII.3 Conditions of judgment ; VII.4 Fittingness ; VII.4.1 The fitting in Aristotle ; VII.4.2 The fitting in Samuel Clarke ; VII.4.3 The fitting in later theorists ; VII.5 Fittingness as a normative standard for judgment ; VII.5.1 The fittingness relation ; VII.5.2 What is fitted to conditions ; VII.5.3 Fittingness, the good life, and comparability ; VII.5.4 Examples ; VIII. Critical Assessment ; VIII.1 Evaluation, supervenience, and justification ; VIII.1.1 The nature of supervenience in detail ; VIII.1.2 Supervenience - explanation ; VIII.1.3 Supervenience - application ; VIII.2 Publicity ; VIII.3 The relation between standpoints ; VIII.4 Objectivity and subjectivity ; Part Three ; IX. Response-Dependent Value ; IX.1 Reasons, ends, and value ; IX.2 Early response-dependence accounts ; IX.2.1 McDowell ; IX.2.2 Wiggins ; IX.3 Value: Concept vs. Property ; IX.4 Response-dependent value ; IX.4.1 Responses ; IX.4.2 Subjects ; IX.4.3 Conditions ; X. Objections to Response-Dependent Value ; X.1 Subjects of the value relation ; X.2 Response-dependent value: backdrop for the problem ; X.3 Response-dependent value: the problem motivated ; X.4 Floating reference: a cautionary note ; X.5 Relativism ; XI. Other issues ; XI.1 The circularity ; XI.2 Cuneo on practical wisdom ; XI. 3 Hussain and Shah's dilemma ; XI.4 Euthyphro dilemmas ; XI.4.1 Shafer-Landau's dilemma ; XI.4.2 Timmons' dilemma ; XI.5 Timmons on moral symmetry ; XI.6 Moral psychology ; XII. Respect for Others ; XII.1 Expressions of the target idea ; XII.2 The problem in a cartoon ; XII.3 First step at solution ; XII.3.1 Constructing reasons for respect ; XII.3.2 Respect and rights ; XII.3.3 VE's analysis of claims ; XII.3.4 VE's analysis of other rights ; XII.3.5 Respect and living well ; XII.3.6 THe extent of respect ; XII.3.7 Two Kantian notes ; XII.4 Revisiting the concern ; XII.4.1 Wrong Attitudes ; XII.4.2 The two-level structure ; XII.4.3 Fit with ordinary practice

This is an exceptionally fine book... I recommend it highly to those interested in Aristotelian ethics, and I consider it essential reading to those who follow and participate in recent discussions in meta-ethics.