The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility

Dana Kay Nelkin (Ph.D. UCLA) is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego, and Affiliate Professor at the University of San Diego School of Law. Her areas of research include moral psychology, ethics, bioethics, and philosophy of law. She is the author of Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility, and co-editor of the The Ethics and Law of Omissions. Her work in moral psychology includes participation in an interdisciplinary research collaboration of philosophers and psychologists, The Moral Judgements Project.Derk Pereboom (Ph.D. UCLA) is the Susan Linn Sage Professor in the Philosophy Department at Cornell University and Senior Associate Dean for Arts and Humanities in Cornell's College of Arts and Sciences. His areas of research include free will and moral responsibility, philosophy of mind, early modern philosophy, especially Kant, and philosophy of religion. He is the author of Living without Free Will, Consciousness and the Prospects ofPhysicalism, Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life, and he is co-author with Michael McKenna of Free Will: A Contemporary Introduction. He has published articles on free will and moral responsibility, consciousness and physicalism, nonreductive materialism, divine providence, the problem of evil, and on Kant's metaphysics and epistemology.

• Introduction Dana Kay Nelkin and Derk Pereboom I. Theories of Responsibility 1. Instrumentalist Theories of Responsibility Manuel Vargas 2. Reasons-Responsiveness, Frankfurt Examples, and the Free Will Ability Michael McKenna 3. Attributionist Theories of Responsibility Matthew Talbert II. Kinds of Responsibility 4. Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: On Different Kinds of Moral Responsibility Sofia Jeppsson III. Dimensions of Responsibility 5. Responsibility for Acts and Omissions Randolph Clarke 6. Degrees of Responsibility Justin Coates 7. Group Responsibility Christian List IV. Determinism and the Ability to Do Otherwise 8. Moral Responsibility, Alternative Possibilities, and Frankfurt Examples Derk Pereboom 9. Manipulation Arguments against Compatibilism Derk Pereboom and Michael McKenna V. Skepticism 10. Illusionism Saul Smilansky 11. Free Will Skepticism and Criminal Justice: The Public Health-Quarantine Model Gregg D. Caruso 12. Metaskepticism Tamler Sommers VI. Blame 13. Blame and Holding Responsible Angela Smith 14. Responsibility and the Reactive Attitudes R. Jay Wallace 15. Response-Dependence Accounts of Blameworthiness David Shoemaker VII. Responsibility, Knowledge, and Causation 16. Ethics is Hard! What Follows? On Moral Ignorance and Blame Elizabeth Harman 17. Responsibility and Causation Carolina Sartorio VIII. Responsibility, Law, and Justice 18. Responsibility, Punishment, and Predominant Retributivism David Brink 19. Legal Responsibility: Psychopathy, a Case Study Elizabeth Shaw 20. Responsibility and Distributive Justice Richard Arneson IX. Responsibility, Neuroscience, and Psychology 21. Responsibility and Neuroscience Alfred R. Mele 22. Responsibility and Consciousness Peter Carruthers and Matt King 23. Responsibility and Situationism Brandon Warmke 24. Experimental Philosophy and Moral Responsibility Gunnar Björnsson X. Responsibility, Relationships, and Meaning in Life 25. Moral Responsibility and Existential Attitudes Paul Russell 26. Relationships and Responsibility Dana Kay Nelkin 27. Responsibility, Personal Relationships, and the Significance of the Reactive Attitudes Seth Shabo 28. Forgiveness Per-Erik Milam 29. Reconciliation and he End of Responsibility Linda Radzik 30. Responsibility and Religion Dan Speak XI. Case Studies 31. Moral Responsibility in the Context of Addiction Doug McConnell 32. Moral Responsibility for Implicit Bias and the Impact of Social Categorization Maureen Sie 33. Atrocity, Evil, and Responsibility John Doris and Dominic Murphy