The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility

Dana Kay Nelkin (Ph.D. UCLA) is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego, and Affiliate Professor at the University of San Diego School of Law. Her areas of research include moral psychology, ethics, bioethics, and philosophy of law. She is the author of Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility, and co-editor of the The Ethics and Law of Omissions. Her work in moral psychology includes participation in an interdisciplinary research collaboration of philosophers and psychologists, The Moral Judgements Project.Derk Pereboom (Ph.D. UCLA) is the Susan Linn Sage Professor in the Philosophy Department at Cornell University and Senior Associate Dean for Arts and Humanities in Cornell's College of Arts and Sciences. His areas of research include free will and moral responsibility, philosophy of mind, early modern philosophy, especially Kant, and philosophy of religion. He is the author of Living without Free Will, Consciousness and the Prospects ofPhysicalism, Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life, and he is co-author with Michael McKenna of Free Will: A Contemporary Introduction. He has published articles on free will and moral responsibility, consciousness and physicalism, nonreductive materialism, divine providence, the problem of evil, and on Kant's metaphysics and epistemology.

• Introduction Dana Kay Nelkin and Derk Pereboom I. Theories of Responsibility1. Instrumentalist Theories of Responsibility Manuel Vargas2. Reasons-Responsiveness, Frankfurt Examples, and the Free Will Ability Michael McKenna 3. Attributionist Theories of Responsibility Matthew Talbert II. Kinds of Responsibility4. Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: On Different Kinds of Moral Responsibility Sofia Jeppsson III. Dimensions of Responsibility5. Responsibility for Acts and Omissions Randolph Clarke6. Degrees of Responsibility Justin Coates7. Group Responsibility Christian List IV. Determinism and the Ability to Do Otherwise8. Moral Responsibility, Alternative Possibilities, and Frankfurt Examples Derk Pereboom9. Manipulation Arguments against Compatibilism Derk Pereboom and Michael McKenna V. Skepticism10. Illusionism Saul Smilansky11. Free Will Skepticism and Criminal Justice: The Public Health-Quarantine Model Gregg D. Caruso12. Metaskepticism Tamler Sommers VI. Blame13. Blame and Holding Responsible Angela Smith 14. Responsibility and the Reactive Attitudes R. Jay Wallace15. Response-Dependence Accounts of Blameworthiness David Shoemaker VII. Responsibility, Knowledge, and Causation16. Ethics is Hard! What Follows? On Moral Ignorance and Blame Elizabeth Harman17. Responsibility and Causation Carolina Sartorio VIII. Responsibility, Law, and Justice18. Responsibility, Punishment, and Predominant Retributivism David Brink19. Legal Responsibility: Psychopathy, a Case Study Elizabeth Shaw20. Responsibility and Distributive Justice Richard Arneson IX. Responsibility, Neuroscience, and Psychology21. Responsibility and Neuroscience Alfred R. Mele22. Responsibility and Consciousness Peter Carruthers and Matt King23. Responsibility and Situationism Brandon Warmke24. Experimental Philosophy and Moral Responsibility Gunnar Björnsson X. Responsibility, Relationships, and Meaning in Life25. Moral Responsibility and Existential Attitudes Paul Russell26. Relationships and Responsibility Dana Kay Nelkin27. Responsibility, Personal Relationships, and the Significance of the Reactive Attitudes Seth Shabo28. Forgiveness Per-Erik Milam29. Reconciliation and he End of Responsibility Linda Radzik30. Responsibility and Religion Dan Speak XI. Case Studies31. Moral Responsibility in the Context of Addiction Doug McConnell32. Moral Responsibility for Implicit Bias and the Impact of Social Categorization Maureen Sie33. Atrocity, Evil, and Responsibility John Doris and Dominic Murphy