Ishtiyaque Haji is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Calgary. His research areas are in ethical theory, philosophy of action, metaphysics, and philosophical psychology. He is author of Luck's Mischief (2016) and Reason's Debt to Freedom (2012), both with Oxford University Press.

In his exciting and challenging new book, The Obligation Dilemma, Ishtiyaque Haji presents forceful arguments which, if correct, show that moral obligation is incompatible both with determinism and with indeterminism. Determinism plausibly would entail that we lack the kind of freedom of action that, arguably, we must have, if we have any obligations. Indeterminism plausibly would entail that we lack the kind of control over our actions that, arguably, we must have, if we have any obligations. Since our world is either deterministic or indeterministic, Haji's arguments thus seem to show that there are no moral obligations. Must we conclude that everything is permitted? This is a significant challenge to moral philosophy, and to our conception of morality as setting constraints on how we are permitted to act.

Ishtiyaque Haji is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Calgary. His research areas are in ethical theory, philosophy of action, metaphysics, and philosophical psychology. He is author of Luck's Mischief (2016) and Reason's Debt to Freedom (2012), both with Oxford University Press.

In his exciting and challenging new book, The Obligation Dilemma, Ishtiyaque Haji presents forceful arguments which, if correct, show that moral obligation is incompatible both with determinism and with indeterminism. Determinism plausibly would entail that we lack the kind of freedom of action that, arguably, we must have, if we have any obligations. Indeterminism plausibly would entail that we lack the kind of control over our actions that, arguably, we must have, if we have any obligations. Since our world is either deterministic or indeterministic, Haji's arguments thus seem to show that there are no moral obligations. Must we conclude that everything is permitted? This is a significant challenge to moral philosophy, and to our conception of morality as setting constraints on how we are permitted to act.

Ishtiyaque Haji is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Calgary. His research areas are in ethical theory, philosophy of action, metaphysics, and philosophical psychology. He is author of Luck's Mischief (2016) and Reason's Debt to Freedom (2012), both with Oxford University Press.

In his exciting and challenging new book, The Obligation Dilemma, Ishtiyaque Haji presents forceful arguments which, if correct, show that moral obligation is incompatible both with determinism and with indeterminism. Determinism plausibly would entail that we lack the kind of freedom of action that, arguably, we must have, if we have any obligations. Indeterminism plausibly would entail that we lack the kind of control over our actions that, arguably, we must have, if we have any obligations. Since our world is either deterministic or indeterministic, Haji's arguments thus seem to show that there are no moral obligations. Must we conclude that everything is permitted? This is a significant challenge to moral philosophy, and to our conception of morality as setting constraints on how we are permitted to act.