The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement

Daniel A. Crane is a law professor at the University of Michigan, where he teaches contracts, antitrust, and antitrust and intellectual property. His scholarship has focused primarily on antitrust and economic regulation, particularly the institutional structure of antitrust enforcement, predatory pricing, bundling, and the antitrust implications of various patent practices. His work has appeared in the University of Chicago Law Review, the Texas Law Review, California Law Review, the Michigan Law Review, the Cornell Law Review, and the Minnesota Law Review, among other journals. He is the co-editor (with Eleanor Fox) of the Antitrust Stories volume of Foundation Press's Law Stories series.

• Acknowledgments ; Introduction ; Part I - Origins and Development of U.S. Antitrust Institutions ; Chapter One: Antifederalism and Corporate Regulation ; Chapter Two: The Curious Case of Dual Federal Enforcement ; Chapter Three: Private Enforcement: Growth and Backlash ; Chapter Four: Shifting Towards Technocracy ; Part II - Optimizing Institutional Performance ; Chapter Five: Adjudication, Regulation, and Administration ; Chapter Six. The Much-Maligned Antitrust Jury ; Chapter Seven: Improving Public Enforcement ; Chapter Eight: State Enforcement and Federal Preemption ; Chapter Nine: Rethinking Private Enforcement ; Part III - Comparative and International Perspectives ; Chapter Ten: How and Why is Europe Different? ; Chapter Eleven: Emerging Antitrust Institutions Around the World ; Chapter Twelve: Toward International Antitrust Institutions? ; Index

"Daniel Crane's book contributes more to our comprehension of U.S. antitrust law than any other work of scholarship written in the past decade." --Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Consultant to Director Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission"There is a great need for a well-done study of antitrust enforcement institutions, and, finally, we have it! Crane's study is sweeping, measured, and informed. Sweeping, historically and geographically; measured in its policy prescriptions; and informed by the facts. Crane's focus on what's really true about antitrust institutions, rather than just going on preconceptions, is commendable. This, alone, distinguishes Crane's work from anything else in the field." --Harry First, Charles L. Denison Professor of Law, New York University School of Law"Daniel Crane's The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement is the first book to cover the history, economics, ideology, and mechanics of antitrust enforcement, along with the public and private institutions through which it is pursued. This is a marvelous book that every antitrust scholar should read." --Herbert Hovenkamp, Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of IowaA "superb volume . . . Professor Crane skillfully advances a basic and powerful proposition: to master analytical principles without deep knowledge of the policy implementation mechanism is dangerously incomplete preparation for understanding the U.S. antitrust system, or any body of competition law." --William E. Kovacic, Former Chair of the Federal Trade Commission and Professor, George Washington University, The Institutions of Antitrust Law: How Structure Shapes Substance, 110 Michigan Law Review 1019 (2012)."Perhaps the best feature of Crane's work (and this book is no exception) is that his multi-faceted approach offers something for everyone: economists, lawyers, and practitioners will all learn from the book. My overall view of the quality of Professor Crane´s book -- no surprise to readers of his academic articles from which the book is largely derived -- is perhaps best revealed by the company it will now keep on that book shelf." --Joshua Wright, Antitrust and Competition Policy Blog, September 19, 2011."Crane argues convincingly that institutions matter and that history matters as much as logic in designing workable structures. However, the real value in his work is his meticulous analysis of how the current world no longer fully matches up with that history and of the need to do better." --Spencer Weber Waller, Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law"In sum, this book is endlessly fascinating, educational, and for those in the academic and policy realms, even useful. Crane is leading the charge toward a new theory of antitrust that may permit or require the revisiting of substantive legal rules in light of new understandings of their application in the real world of enforcement. In so doing he may be establishing himself as a leader of a new academic antitrust movement that also has tremendous practicalconsequences. If it means more writing in this vein, I hope so." --Max Huffman, Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law