Alvin E. Roth was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics 2012 for his work on market design. He received his B.S. from Columbia University in 1971 and Ph.D. from Stanford University in 1974. He taught at the University of Illinois from 1974-82, at the University of Pittsburgh from 1982-98, at Harvard University from 1998 to 2012, and he now teaches at Stanford. Nir Vulkan is an Economics Professor at the Säid Business School and a Fellow of Worcester College, Oxford University. He has written many articles on market design and is author of The Economics of E- Commerce (Princeton University Press, 2003). He has worked with many software and e-commerce companies designing markets mainly on the Internet, which are used by humans and software agents. His algorithms for automated trading have been used by hedge funds to trade futures in markets all over the world. Zvika Neeman is a microeconomic and game theorist who specializes in mechanism design. He teaches at the Berglas School of Economics at Tel Aviv University. Prior to that, he held positions at Boston University and at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

• PART I: GENERAL PRINCIPLES; PART II: CASES; SECTION II.A: MATCHING MARKETS; SECTION II.B: AUCTIONS; SECTION II.C: E-COMMERCE; SECTION II.D: LAW DESIGN; PART III: EXPERIMENTS; PART IV: COMPETING DESIGNS

The breadth of innovative research on market designs should open the readers imagination to the vast possibilities in this exciting subject area.

Alvin E. Roth was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics 2012 for his work on market design. He received his B.S. from Columbia University in 1971 and Ph.D. from Stanford University in 1974. He taught at the University of Illinois from 1974-82, at the University of Pittsburgh from 1982-98, at Harvard University from 1998 to 2012, and he now teaches at Stanford. Nir Vulkan is an Economics Professor at the Säid Business School and a Fellow of Worcester College, Oxford University. He has written many articles on market design and is author of The Economics of E- Commerce (Princeton University Press, 2003). He has worked with many software and e-commerce companies designing markets mainly on the Internet, which are used by humans and software agents. His algorithms for automated trading have been used by hedge funds to trade futures in markets all over the world. Zvika Neeman is a microeconomic and game theorist who specializes in mechanism design. He teaches at the Berglas School of Economics at Tel Aviv University. Prior to that, he held positions at Boston University and at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

• PART I: GENERAL PRINCIPLES; PART II: CASES; SECTION II.A: MATCHING MARKETS; SECTION II.B: AUCTIONS; SECTION II.C: E-COMMERCE; SECTION II.D: LAW DESIGN; PART III: EXPERIMENTS; PART IV: COMPETING DESIGNS

The breadth of innovative research on market designs should open the readers imagination to the vast possibilities in this exciting subject area.

Alvin E. Roth was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics 2012 for his work on market design. He received his B.S. from Columbia University in 1971 and Ph.D. from Stanford University in 1974. He taught at the University of Illinois from 1974-82, at the University of Pittsburgh from 1982-98, at Harvard University from 1998 to 2012, and he now teaches at Stanford. Nir Vulkan is an Economics Professor at the Säid Business School and a Fellow of Worcester College, Oxford University. He has written many articles on market design and is author of The Economics of E- Commerce (Princeton University Press, 2003). He has worked with many software and e-commerce companies designing markets mainly on the Internet, which are used by humans and software agents. His algorithms for automated trading have been used by hedge funds to trade futures in markets all over the world. Zvika Neeman is a microeconomic and game theorist who specializes in mechanism design. He teaches at the Berglas School of Economics at Tel Aviv University. Prior to that, he held positions at Boston University and at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

• PART I: GENERAL PRINCIPLES; PART II: CASES; SECTION II.A: MATCHING MARKETS; SECTION II.B: AUCTIONS; SECTION II.C: E-COMMERCE; SECTION II.D: LAW DESIGN; PART III: EXPERIMENTS; PART IV: COMPETING DESIGNS

The breadth of innovative research on market designs should open the readers imagination to the vast possibilities in this exciting subject area.