The German Army and the Defence of the Reich

Military Doctrine and the Conduct of the Defensive Battle 1918-1939

Häftad, Engelska, 2017

AvMatthias Strohn,Matthias (Senior Lecturer in War Studies) Strohn

549 kr

Beställningsvara. Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar. Fri frakt för medlemmar vid köp för minst 249 kr.

Finns i fler format (1)

Inbunden

1 609 kr

Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar

Historical research on the German army of the interwar period has concentrated on the development of the so-called 'Blitzkrieg'. However, Matthias Strohn shows that for most of the time the German army, restricted by the terms of the Versailles Treaty, was too weak to launch an offensive war or even effectively repel an invader. Accordingly, the army focused instead primarily on planning a defensive war against superior enemies, especially France and Poland. Making extensive use of German archival sources, Strohn explores the development of military thought and doctrine for the defence of Germany and shows how these ideas were tested in war games and staff rides. His findings comprehensively revise our understanding of the German army in this period, shedding new light on the ideas of leading figures in the German military and how events, such as the occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, influenced military planning.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2017-02-02
Mått152 x 229 x 15 mm
Vikt395 g
FormatHäftad
SpråkEngelska
SerieCambridge Military Histories
Antal sidor292
FörlagCambridge University Press
ISBN9781316633694

Tillhör följande kategorier

Matthias Strohn was educated at the Universities of Münster, Germany, and Oxford where he obtained a Masters degree and a Doctorate. He teaches military history to British army officer cadets and officers at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. He currently holds the rank of Captain in the German armed forces (Bundeswehr) reserve and is attached to the German staff college where he lectures on military history to international staff and German general staff officers.

Introduction and definitions; Part I. The Foundations of Defensive Warfare in the Inter-War Period: 1. Defence doctrine before the First World War; 2. The lessons of the First World War; 3. Military planning in the aftermath of the First World War; Part II. The Seeckt Era: Years of Ignorance: 4. Hans von Seeckt and the rebirth of the offensive; 5. The manual Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen and the conduct of the defensive battle; Part III. Adapting to Reality 1923–33: 6. Military thought after the occupation of the Ruhr; 7. Civil-military co-operation; 8. The manual Truppenführung and the increased importance of defence; Part IV. Defensive Warfare in the Third Reich 1933–9: 9. Political ideology versus military reality: defensive warfare 1933–6; 10. The rebirth of offensive warfare 1936–9; Conclusion: the defensive battle in the Second World War and beyond.

'Strohn's stimulating study of German military thought during the interwar period ably tracks the development of a defensive doctrine in which the offensive remained paramount at the tactical level. It will appeal not only to military historians interested in the nuts and bolts of the tactical defensive but also to scholars more generally interested in military decision making and diplomacy during the interwar period.' Journal of Contemporary History