The Control of Corporate Europe

Häftad, Engelska, 2002

2 509 kr

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Written by an international team of authors, this book provides the first systematic account of the control of corporate Europe based on voting block data disclosed in accordance with the European Union's Large Holdings Directive (88/627/EEC). The study provides detailed information on the voting control of companies listed on the official markets in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and, as a benchmark comparison, the United States. The authors record a high concentration of control of corporations in many European countries with single blockholders frequently controlling more than fifty per cent of corporate votes. In contrast, a majority of UK listed companies have no blockholder owning more than ten per cent of shares, and a majority of US listed companies have no blockholder with more than six per cent of shares. Those chapters devoted to individual countries illustrate how blockholders can use legal devices to leverage their voting power over their cash-flow rights, or how incumbents prevent outsiders from gaining voting control. It is shown that the cultural and linguistic diversity of Europe is (almost) matched by its variety of corporate control arrangements.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2002-10-10
Mått156 x 234 x 19 mm
Vikt507 g
FormatHäftad
SpråkEngelska
Antal sidor356
FörlagOUP OXFORD
ISBN9780199257539

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Fabrizio Barca is General Director for Development at the Italian Treasury, President of the OECD Territorial Policies Committee, and Director of a Research Programme on Corporate and Public Administration Governance at Siena University.Marco Becht teaches at the Institute for European Studies, the Solvay Business School, and the Law Faculty of the Université Libre de Bruxelles. Becht's research focuses on corporate governance and empirical corporate finance. He is a Resident Fellow at ECARES and a Research Associate of CEPR.

1. The Control of Corporate Europe ; 2. The Separation of Ownership and Control in Austria ; 3. Shareholding Cascades: The Separation of Ownership and Control in Belgium ; 4. Ownership and Voting Power in France ; 5. Ownership and Voting Power in Germany ; 6. Pyramidal Groups and the Separation between Ownership and Control in Italy ; 7. Ownership and Control in the Netherlands ; 8. Ownership and Control of Spanish Listed Firms ; 9. Ownership and Control in Sweden--Strong Owners, Weak Minorities, and Social Control ; 10. Strong Managers and Passive Institutional Investors in the United Kingdom ; 11. Beneficial Ownership in the United States ; THE LARGE HOLDINGS DIRECTIVE ; COMPARATIVE TABLES

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