The Collective-Action Constitution

Neil S. Siegel is the David W. Ichel Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science at Duke Law School, where he also serves as Associate Dean for Intellectual Life and Director of the Summer Institute on Law and Policy. He has been writing, teaching, speaking, debating, and testifying about the U.S. Constitution, constitutional law, and the federal courts since 2004. A former law clerk to Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, he has worked in the United States Senate on the nominations of six current Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States.

• Introduction Part I: Thinking Constitutionally, and Collectively1. Foundations: McCulloch2. The New <"Science of Politics> " Part II: A Collective-Action Theory of the Federal Structure-and Its Limits3. The Roles of the States and the Interstate Compacts Clause4. The Necessity of Federal Power: Taxing, Spending, and Borrowing5. Interstate Commerce, Foreign Commerce, and Related Principles6. National Security, Positive Externalities, and National Uniformity7. Executive Energy, Judicial Authority, and Federal Supremacy8. Races to the Bottom, Interstate Coordination, and Territorial Empire9. Constitutional Rights, Collective Action, and Individual Action Part III: Perfecting the Collective-Action Constitution 10. The Collective Costs of Strict Supermajority Requirements11. The Problem of Congressional Gridlock Conclusion Postscript on Methodology Index of Constitutional ProvisionsIndex of CasesGeneral Index

Neil Siegel's Collective Action Constitution is a terrific book. Its underpinning is an idea that is as basic as it is important: government exists to deal with problems that come from people living together in less-than-perfect harmony. Professor Siegel molds that general idea into a more precise claim.