The Brain in a Vat

Sanford C. Goldberg is Professor of Philosophy and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at Northwestern University, Illinois, and Professorial Fellow in the Department of Philosophy and Eidyn Research Centre at the University of Edinburgh, Scotland. He is the author of Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification (Cambridge, 2007), Relying on Others: An Essay in Epistemology (2010) and Assertion: A Philosophical Essay on Assertoric Speech (2015). He is also the editor of Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology (2007) and Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism: New Essays (Cambridge, forthcoming, 2015).

• 1. Introduction: Putnam's reflections on the brain in a vat Sanford C. Goldberg; Part I. Intentionality and the Philosophy of Mind and Language: 2. Putnam on brains in a vat Tony Brueckner; 3. How to think about whether we are brains in vats Gary Ebbs; 4. Extended minds in vats Sven Bernecker; 5. Brains in vats, causal constraints on reference and semantic externalism Jesper Kallestrup; Part II. Epistemology: 6. Putnam on BIVs and radical skepticism Duncan Pritchard and Chris Ranalli; 7. BIVs, sensitivity, discrimination, and relevant alternatives Kelly Becker; 8. New lessons from old demons: the case for reliabilism Thomas Grundmann; Part III. Metaphysics: 9. Brains in vats and model theory Tim Button; 10. Realism, skepticism, and the brain in a vat Janet Folina; 11. Rethinking semantic naturalism Igor Douven; 12. Internal to what? Contemporary naturalism and Putnam's model-theoretic argument Patricia Marino; 13. The model-theoretic argument: from skepticism to a new understanding Gila Sher; 14. Eligibility and ideology in the vat Tim Sundell; Bibliography; Index.

'This important new book brings Putnam's famous brain-in-a-vat argument bang up to date. Cutting edge papers by some of today's leading philosophers show how the argument provides a powerful lens through which to examine central topics such as semantic externalism, self-knowledge, the nature of justification, and metaphysical realism.' Åsa Wikforss, Stockholms Universitet