Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen is professor of political theory at University of Aarhus, Denmark and professor II in philosophy at the Arctic University of Norway-UiT. He has published widely on issues in ethics and political philosophy. Previous books include: Born Free and Equal (Oxford University Press, 2013), Relational Egalitarianism (Cambridge University Press, 2018), Making Sense of Affirmative Action (Oxford University Press, 2020). He was associate editor at Ethics (2008-2020) and Chair for the Society for Applied Philosophy 2011-2014. Presently, he is director of the Center for the Experimental-Philosophical Study of Discrimination, University of Aarhus.

• Acknowledgements Introduction1. Topic and main aims2. Structure3. Significance Chapter 1: Hypocritical blame1. Introduction2. When is blame hypocritical? 2.1 The blaming condition2.2 The incoherence condition2.3 The no-self-blame condition2.4 The no-justification condition 2.5 Summary3. Standing to blame and its denial4. Other accounts of what it is to dismiss blame on grounds of the hypocrite's lack of standing5. Conclusion Chapter 2: Complications and defeaters of standing1. Introduction2. Private blame3. Self-blame4. Third-person blame5. Degrees of blame and degrees of standing6. Skepticism about standing to blame7. Why does hypocrisy undermine standing to blame?8. Conclusion Chapter 3: What, if anything, makes hypocritical blame morally wrong?1. Introduction2. Lack of desert 3. Lack of commitment 4. Wrong attention 5. Transgression of moral authority 6. Failure of reciprocity7. Moral community 8. Implying falsehoods 9. A clash with moral equality 10. Conclusion Chapter 4: Other ways of not having standing to blame1. Introduction2. Tu quoque3. Complicity4. None of your business5. <"You don't know what it's like> "6. <"You don't accept that principle yourself> "7. Conclusion Chapter 5: Praising1. Introduction2. What is praising?3. Standing to praise4. Hypocritical praise5. The wrongfulness of hypocritical praise6. Other forms of standingless praise7. Standing to prame8. Conclusion Chapter 6: Forgiving1. Introduction2. What is it to forgive?3. Dismissing forgiveness as standingless4. Hypocritical forgiving5. What undermines standing to forgive?6. The wrongfulness of hypocritical forgiveness7. Other ways in which forgiving can be standingless8. Fromtaking9. Conclusion10. Appendix: Forgiving and standing to apologize Chapter 7: Morality, normativity, and standing1. Introduction2. Encouraging3. Epistemic blame4. Consequentialism, deontology, and the interpersonal nature of holding accountable5. Standing and moral encroachment6. Conclusion Bibliography Index

Recommended. Upper-division undergraduates through faculty; general readers.

Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen is professor of political theory at University of Aarhus, Denmark and professor II in philosophy at the Arctic University of Norway-UiT. He has published widely on issues in ethics and political philosophy. Previous books include: Born Free and Equal (Oxford University Press, 2013), Relational Egalitarianism (Cambridge University Press, 2018), Making Sense of Affirmative Action (Oxford University Press, 2020). He was associate editor at Ethics (2008-2020) and Chair for the Society for Applied Philosophy 2011-2014. Presently, he is director of the Center for the Experimental-Philosophical Study of Discrimination, University of Aarhus.

• Acknowledgements Introduction1. Topic and main aims2. Structure3. Significance Chapter 1: Hypocritical blame1. Introduction2. When is blame hypocritical? 2.1 The blaming condition2.2 The incoherence condition2.3 The no-self-blame condition2.4 The no-justification condition 2.5 Summary3. Standing to blame and its denial4. Other accounts of what it is to dismiss blame on grounds of the hypocrite's lack of standing5. Conclusion Chapter 2: Complications and defeaters of standing1. Introduction2. Private blame3. Self-blame4. Third-person blame5. Degrees of blame and degrees of standing6. Skepticism about standing to blame7. Why does hypocrisy undermine standing to blame?8. Conclusion Chapter 3: What, if anything, makes hypocritical blame morally wrong?1. Introduction2. Lack of desert 3. Lack of commitment 4. Wrong attention 5. Transgression of moral authority 6. Failure of reciprocity7. Moral community 8. Implying falsehoods 9. A clash with moral equality 10. Conclusion Chapter 4: Other ways of not having standing to blame1. Introduction2. Tu quoque3. Complicity4. None of your business5. <"You don't know what it's like> "6. <"You don't accept that principle yourself> "7. Conclusion Chapter 5: Praising1. Introduction2. What is praising?3. Standing to praise4. Hypocritical praise5. The wrongfulness of hypocritical praise6. Other forms of standingless praise7. Standing to prame8. Conclusion Chapter 6: Forgiving1. Introduction2. What is it to forgive?3. Dismissing forgiveness as standingless4. Hypocritical forgiving5. What undermines standing to forgive?6. The wrongfulness of hypocritical forgiveness7. Other ways in which forgiving can be standingless8. Fromtaking9. Conclusion10. Appendix: Forgiving and standing to apologize Chapter 7: Morality, normativity, and standing1. Introduction2. Encouraging3. Epistemic blame4. Consequentialism, deontology, and the interpersonal nature of holding accountable5. Standing and moral encroachment6. Conclusion Bibliography Index

Recommended. Upper-division undergraduates through faculty; general readers.

Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen is professor of political theory at University of Aarhus, Denmark and professor II in philosophy at the Arctic University of Norway-UiT. He has published widely on issues in ethics and political philosophy. Previous books include: Born Free and Equal (Oxford University Press, 2013), Relational Egalitarianism (Cambridge University Press, 2018), Making Sense of Affirmative Action (Oxford University Press, 2020). He was associate editor at Ethics (2008-2020) and Chair for the Society for Applied Philosophy 2011-2014. Presently, he is director of the Center for the Experimental-Philosophical Study of Discrimination, University of Aarhus.

• Acknowledgements Introduction1. Topic and main aims2. Structure3. Significance Chapter 1: Hypocritical blame1. Introduction2. When is blame hypocritical? 2.1 The blaming condition2.2 The incoherence condition2.3 The no-self-blame condition2.4 The no-justification condition 2.5 Summary3. Standing to blame and its denial4. Other accounts of what it is to dismiss blame on grounds of the hypocrite's lack of standing5. Conclusion Chapter 2: Complications and defeaters of standing1. Introduction2. Private blame3. Self-blame4. Third-person blame5. Degrees of blame and degrees of standing6. Skepticism about standing to blame7. Why does hypocrisy undermine standing to blame?8. Conclusion Chapter 3: What, if anything, makes hypocritical blame morally wrong?1. Introduction2. Lack of desert 3. Lack of commitment 4. Wrong attention 5. Transgression of moral authority 6. Failure of reciprocity7. Moral community 8. Implying falsehoods 9. A clash with moral equality 10. Conclusion Chapter 4: Other ways of not having standing to blame1. Introduction2. Tu quoque3. Complicity4. None of your business5. <"You don't know what it's like> "6. <"You don't accept that principle yourself> "7. Conclusion Chapter 5: Praising1. Introduction2. What is praising?3. Standing to praise4. Hypocritical praise5. The wrongfulness of hypocritical praise6. Other forms of standingless praise7. Standing to prame8. Conclusion Chapter 6: Forgiving1. Introduction2. What is it to forgive?3. Dismissing forgiveness as standingless4. Hypocritical forgiving5. What undermines standing to forgive?6. The wrongfulness of hypocritical forgiveness7. Other ways in which forgiving can be standingless8. Fromtaking9. Conclusion10. Appendix: Forgiving and standing to apologize Chapter 7: Morality, normativity, and standing1. Introduction2. Encouraging3. Epistemic blame4. Consequentialism, deontology, and the interpersonal nature of holding accountable5. Standing and moral encroachment6. Conclusion Bibliography Index

Recommended. Upper-division undergraduates through faculty; general readers.