Timothy Williamson is Wykeham Professor of Logic at the University of Oxford and Whitney Griswold Visiting Professor at Yale University. He has also taught at MIT, Princeton, Edinburgh, Trinity College Dublin, Chinese University of Hong Kong, and elsewhere. He works on logic, philosophy of language, epistemology, metaphysics, and metaphilosophy. His books include Doing Philosophy, Tetralogue, Modal Logic as Metaphysics, and The Philosophy of Philosophy. He is a Fellow of the British Academy, Foreign Honorary Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and Member of the Academia Europaea.

• Preface Part I: If 1: The Value of Conditionals 2: The Suppositional Rule 3: Consequences of the Suppositional Rule 4: Heuristics within Heuristics 5: Conditional Testimony 6: The Role of Conditional Propositionals 7: More Challenges 8: Interactions between Plain Conditionals and Quantifiers Part II: Would If 9: Conditionals and Abduction 10: The Interaction of 'If' and 'Would': Semantics and Logic 11: The Interaction of 'If' and 'Would': Heuristics 12: Is 'Would' Hyperintensional? 13: More on the Interaction of 'Would' with Context 14: Thought Experiments and 'Would' 15: Worlds and Meaning 16: Conclusion: Semantics, Heuristics, Pragmatics

this is a powerful book, rich with ideas and sophisticated arguments . . . Philosophers and linguists interested in conditionals are encouraged—unconditionally—to form their own opinion about the arguments that this book provides; it is a rewarding read.