Structural Holes

Ronald S. Burt is Professor at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business.

• Acknowledgments Introduction 1. THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF COMPETITION Opportunity and Capital Information Structural Holes Control and the Tertius Gaudens Entrepreneurs Secondary Holes Structural Autonomy Summary 2. FORMALIZING THE ARGUMENT Network Data Redundancy Constraint Hole Signature Structural Autonomy Summary 3. TURNING A PROFIT Product Networks and Market Profit The Study Population Hole Effects Market Hole Signatures Summary Appendix: Weighing Alternatives 4. GETTING AHEAD Contact Networks and Manager Achievement The Study Population Hole Effects Hierarchy Institutional Holes Selecting a Network Summary Appendix A: Weighing Alternatives Appendix B: Causal Order 5. PLAYER-STRUCTURE DUALITY Structural Unit of Analysis Players and Structures Escape from Attributes No Escape Summary 6. COMMIT AND SURVIVE Holes and Heterogeneity Interface and the Commit Hypothesis Population Ecology and the Survival Hypothesis Summary 7. STRATEGIC EMBEDDING AND INSTITUTIONAL RESIDUE The Other Tertius Strategy Hypothesis Formal Organization as Social Residue Personality as Emotional Residue Summary Notes References Index

A major contribution to structural sociology that will stimulate the imaginations of scholars in disciplines as diverse as sociology, economics, strategy, and marketing.