Strategic Voting

Reshef Meir is a senior lecturer in the Department of Industrial Engineering at Technion-Israel Institute of Technology in Haifa, Israel. Prior to that, he completed a postdoctorate at the Harvard Center for Research on Computation and Society and a Ph.D. in computer science from the Hebrew University. His main research areas are computational game theory, mechanism design, social choice, and bounded rationality. Dr. Meir was named one of AIs Ten to Watch by IEEE Intelligent Systems (2015). In addition, he received the Michael B. Maschler Prize (Game Theory Society), a Rothschild postdoctoral fellowship, the Alon fellowship for young faculty, and an honorable mention for Victor Lesser Distinguished Dissertation Award by IFAAMAS.

• Preface.- Acknowledgments.- Introduction.- Basic Notation.- Strategyproofness and the Gibbard--Satterthwaite Theorem.- Regaining Truthfulness in Voting.- Voting and Mechanism Design.- Simultaneous Voting Games.- Iterative and Sequential Voting.- Voting Heuristics.- Summary: Toward a Complete Theory of Strategic Voting.- Bibliography.- Author's Biography .