Species Problem

David Stamos teaches Philosophy at York University in Toronto.

• Part 1 IntroductionChapter 2 The Species Problem and the Problem of UniversalsChapter 3 Ontology and Criteria of RealityChapter 4 Preliminary Assumptions and ConceptsChapter 5 Abstract of the BookPart 6 Species NominalismChapter 7 Preliminary ConsiderationsChapter 8 Occam and LockeChapter 9 Buffon, Lamarck, and DarwinChapter 10 Modern Nominalists in BiologyPart 11 Species as ClassesChapter 12 Plato, Aristotle, and LinnaeusChapter 13 Species as Elementary ClassesChapter 14 Species as Cluster ClassesChapter 15 Species as Ecological NichesChapter 16 Problems with Species as ClassesPart 17 Species as IndividualsChapter 18 Precursors from Hegel to MayrChapter 19 Ghiselin, Hull, et al.Chapter 20 Punctuated EquilibriaChapter 21 Problems with Species as IndividualsChapter 22 Species as Sets, Clades, and LineagesPart 23 Species as RelationsChapter 24 The Origin of an IdeaChapter 25 Species as Biosimilarity ComplexesChapter 26 Problems with Species as RelationsChapter 27 Concluding Remarks

Stamos provides a thorough introduction to the debate over the ontological status of species. He offers the innovative suggestion that species are neither classes nor individuals, but relations. Stamos's approach is a fresh alternative to the standard, well-worn positions.