PAUL A. RAHE is the Roger and Martha Mertz Visiting Fellow in Classics at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. He holds the Charles O. Lee and Louise K. Lee Chair in the Western Heritage at Hillsdale College, where he is Professor of History, and he currently chairs the Board of Trustees of the Institute of Current World Affairs. He is the author of Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution (1992), Against Throne and Altar (2008), Montesquieu and the Logic of Liberty (2009), Soft Despotism, Democracy’s Drift (2009), and of four recent volumes on the grand strategy of classical Sparta. In recognition of this body of work, the University of Piraeus in Greece conferred on him on 11 April 2022 its Themistocles Statesmanship Award.

• CONTENTSList of Maps xiIntroduction xiiiPrologue: Sparta’s Enduring Strategic Dilemma 3Part One: A Single Spartiate 49Chapter One: Greece’s Wild West 55Chapter Two: A Venture Ill-Advised 78Chapter Three: Philosophy, Sophistry, Impiety,Sacrilege, and Faction 110Part Two: War by Proxy 143Chapter Four: Syracusa Besieged 165Chapter Five: Dancing in the Dark 189Chapter Six: The Flashing Sword of Retribution 217Epilogue: Sparta’s Third Attic War 241Appendix: The Case for Grand Strategy 250List of Abbreviations and Short Titles 263Notes 267Author’s Note and Acknowledgements 351Index 355

Paul Rahe successfully evokes the expeditionary war against Syracuse, while uncovering the Spartan grand strategy that led to Athenian failures.—Edward N. Luttwak, Author of The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire and The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire  In his latest installment of Spartan history, Paul Rahe demonstrates how adroit Spartan grand strategy brought about the Athenian catastrophe on Sicily. Rahe combines mastery of classical sources, secondary work in a multiplicity of languages, wide reading in modern strategic doctrines, and a rare combination of scholarly acumen and common sense, to offer another masterful volume in one of the great projects of modern classical scholarship.  —Victor Davis Hanson, Author of A War Like No Other  Paul Rahe has written a superb account of Sparta’s attempt to prevent Athens from conquering Syracuse in 415-413. Drawing skillfully from Thucydides’ brilliant campaign narrative, Rahe has lucidly and cogently described what he has dubbed Sparta’s Proxy War. Once again, he expertly presents this campaign from the point of view of the Spartans. It is a great achievement, and a welcome one. —Robert B. Strassler, Editor of the Landmark Series of Ancient HistoriansThe fifth installment in Paul Rahe’s erudite study of classical Lacedaemon recounts how Sparta used proxy war and her enemy’s own hubris to inflict a mortal injury on mighty Athens. Long acclaimed for their prowess in battle, Rahe shows that the Spartans were also cunning strategists and problem-solvers fit to rank with history’s finest. An indispensable addition to the ‘school of statesmanship’ with applications for the present day. —A. Wess Mitchell, former Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, and author of The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire Paul Rahe offers a compelling account of Sparta’s strategy to frustrate Athens’s conquest of Sicily during the Peloponnesian War. The annihilation of the Athenian invading forces, Rahe shows, turned on Sparta’s leadership and support for its proxies. This examination of a past proxy war resonates with our own troubled times, as today’s great powers struggle for international mastery while avoiding direct clashes of arms.—John Maurer, Alfred Thayer Mahan Distinguished Professor of Sea Power and Grand Strategy, US Naval War College The winners are said to write history. Yet the Sicilian Expedition is typically described from the defeated Athenians’ viewpoint. Paul Rahe portrays its disastrous war of choice as a massively successful Spartan proxy war, when Sparta’s small investment in Sicilian proxies yielded a huge payoff against its primary adversary, Athens. The lesson: sustaining someone else’s fight has a much higher potential return on investment than joining the fight directly. Bad news for Putin. —S.C.M. Paine, William S Sims University Professor of History and Grand Strategy, US Naval War College Is there more to be learned and are there new lessons to be drawn from Sparta’s war against Athens nearly 2,500 years ago? Yes, and they are set forth with crisp clarity and in sparkling prose by Paul Rahe in Sparta’s Sicilian Proxy War, his latest analysis of classical Sparta’s successful grand strategy against Athens. His analysis has much to teach both classics specialists and newcomers to the field about ancient Greece—and our world today.—Michael Barone, author of Shaping Our Nation Paul Rahe has outdone himself again. A learned study of Sparta’s proxy war against Athens in Sicily—replete with historical analysis and wise observations on grand strategy. It should be on the bookshelves of every strategist and statesman.—Jakub Grygiel, Professor of Politics, The Catholic University of America, and former Senior Advisor in the Office of Policy Planning at the U.S. Department of State

PAUL A. RAHE is the Roger and Martha Mertz Visiting Fellow in Classics at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. He holds the Charles O. Lee and Louise K. Lee Chair in the Western Heritage at Hillsdale College, where he is Professor of History, and he currently chairs the Board of Trustees of the Institute of Current World Affairs. He is the author of Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution (1992), Against Throne and Altar (2008), Montesquieu and the Logic of Liberty (2009), Soft Despotism, Democracy’s Drift (2009), and of four recent volumes on the grand strategy of classical Sparta. In recognition of this body of work, the University of Piraeus in Greece conferred on him on 11 April 2022 its Themistocles Statesmanship Award.

• CONTENTSList of Maps xiIntroduction xiiiPrologue: Sparta’s Enduring Strategic Dilemma 3Part One: A Single Spartiate 49Chapter One: Greece’s Wild West 55Chapter Two: A Venture Ill-Advised 78Chapter Three: Philosophy, Sophistry, Impiety,Sacrilege, and Faction 110Part Two: War by Proxy 143Chapter Four: Syracusa Besieged 165Chapter Five: Dancing in the Dark 189Chapter Six: The Flashing Sword of Retribution 217Epilogue: Sparta’s Third Attic War 241Appendix: The Case for Grand Strategy 250List of Abbreviations and Short Titles 263Notes 267Author’s Note and Acknowledgements 351Index 355

Paul Rahe successfully evokes the expeditionary war against Syracuse, while uncovering the Spartan grand strategy that led to Athenian failures.—Edward N. Luttwak, Author of The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire and The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire  In his latest installment of Spartan history, Paul Rahe demonstrates how adroit Spartan grand strategy brought about the Athenian catastrophe on Sicily. Rahe combines mastery of classical sources, secondary work in a multiplicity of languages, wide reading in modern strategic doctrines, and a rare combination of scholarly acumen and common sense, to offer another masterful volume in one of the great projects of modern classical scholarship.  —Victor Davis Hanson, Author of A War Like No Other  Paul Rahe has written a superb account of Sparta’s attempt to prevent Athens from conquering Syracuse in 415-413. Drawing skillfully from Thucydides’ brilliant campaign narrative, Rahe has lucidly and cogently described what he has dubbed Sparta’s Proxy War. Once again, he expertly presents this campaign from the point of view of the Spartans. It is a great achievement, and a welcome one. —Robert B. Strassler, Editor of the Landmark Series of Ancient HistoriansThe fifth installment in Paul Rahe’s erudite study of classical Lacedaemon recounts how Sparta used proxy war and her enemy’s own hubris to inflict a mortal injury on mighty Athens. Long acclaimed for their prowess in battle, Rahe shows that the Spartans were also cunning strategists and problem-solvers fit to rank with history’s finest. An indispensable addition to the ‘school of statesmanship’ with applications for the present day. —A. Wess Mitchell, former Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, and author of The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire Paul Rahe offers a compelling account of Sparta’s strategy to frustrate Athens’s conquest of Sicily during the Peloponnesian War. The annihilation of the Athenian invading forces, Rahe shows, turned on Sparta’s leadership and support for its proxies. This examination of a past proxy war resonates with our own troubled times, as today’s great powers struggle for international mastery while avoiding direct clashes of arms.—John Maurer, Alfred Thayer Mahan Distinguished Professor of Sea Power and Grand Strategy, US Naval War College The winners are said to write history. Yet the Sicilian Expedition is typically described from the defeated Athenians’ viewpoint. Paul Rahe portrays its disastrous war of choice as a massively successful Spartan proxy war, when Sparta’s small investment in Sicilian proxies yielded a huge payoff against its primary adversary, Athens. The lesson: sustaining someone else’s fight has a much higher potential return on investment than joining the fight directly. Bad news for Putin. —S.C.M. Paine, William S Sims University Professor of History and Grand Strategy, US Naval War College Is there more to be learned and are there new lessons to be drawn from Sparta’s war against Athens nearly 2,500 years ago? Yes, and they are set forth with crisp clarity and in sparkling prose by Paul Rahe in Sparta’s Sicilian Proxy War, his latest analysis of classical Sparta’s successful grand strategy against Athens. His analysis has much to teach both classics specialists and newcomers to the field about ancient Greece—and our world today.—Michael Barone, author of Shaping Our Nation Paul Rahe has outdone himself again. A learned study of Sparta’s proxy war against Athens in Sicily—replete with historical analysis and wise observations on grand strategy. It should be on the bookshelves of every strategist and statesman.—Jakub Grygiel, Professor of Politics, The Catholic University of America, and former Senior Advisor in the Office of Policy Planning at the U.S. Department of State

PAUL A. RAHE is the Roger and Martha Mertz Visiting Fellow in Classics at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. He holds the Charles O. Lee and Louise K. Lee Chair in the Western Heritage at Hillsdale College, where he is Professor of History, and he currently chairs the Board of Trustees of the Institute of Current World Affairs. He is the author of Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution (1992), Against Throne and Altar (2008), Montesquieu and the Logic of Liberty (2009), Soft Despotism, Democracy’s Drift (2009), and of four recent volumes on the grand strategy of classical Sparta. In recognition of this body of work, the University of Piraeus in Greece conferred on him on 11 April 2022 its Themistocles Statesmanship Award.

• CONTENTSList of Maps xiIntroduction xiiiPrologue: Sparta’s Enduring Strategic Dilemma 3Part One: A Single Spartiate 49Chapter One: Greece’s Wild West 55Chapter Two: A Venture Ill-Advised 78Chapter Three: Philosophy, Sophistry, Impiety,Sacrilege, and Faction 110Part Two: War by Proxy 143Chapter Four: Syracusa Besieged 165Chapter Five: Dancing in the Dark 189Chapter Six: The Flashing Sword of Retribution 217Epilogue: Sparta’s Third Attic War 241Appendix: The Case for Grand Strategy 250List of Abbreviations and Short Titles 263Notes 267Author’s Note and Acknowledgements 351Index 355

Paul Rahe successfully evokes the expeditionary war against Syracuse, while uncovering the Spartan grand strategy that led to Athenian failures.—Edward N. Luttwak, Author of The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire and The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire  In his latest installment of Spartan history, Paul Rahe demonstrates how adroit Spartan grand strategy brought about the Athenian catastrophe on Sicily. Rahe combines mastery of classical sources, secondary work in a multiplicity of languages, wide reading in modern strategic doctrines, and a rare combination of scholarly acumen and common sense, to offer another masterful volume in one of the great projects of modern classical scholarship.  —Victor Davis Hanson, Author of A War Like No Other  Paul Rahe has written a superb account of Sparta’s attempt to prevent Athens from conquering Syracuse in 415-413. Drawing skillfully from Thucydides’ brilliant campaign narrative, Rahe has lucidly and cogently described what he has dubbed Sparta’s Proxy War. Once again, he expertly presents this campaign from the point of view of the Spartans. It is a great achievement, and a welcome one. —Robert B. Strassler, Editor of the Landmark Series of Ancient HistoriansThe fifth installment in Paul Rahe’s erudite study of classical Lacedaemon recounts how Sparta used proxy war and her enemy’s own hubris to inflict a mortal injury on mighty Athens. Long acclaimed for their prowess in battle, Rahe shows that the Spartans were also cunning strategists and problem-solvers fit to rank with history’s finest. An indispensable addition to the ‘school of statesmanship’ with applications for the present day. —A. Wess Mitchell, former Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, and author of The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire Paul Rahe offers a compelling account of Sparta’s strategy to frustrate Athens’s conquest of Sicily during the Peloponnesian War. The annihilation of the Athenian invading forces, Rahe shows, turned on Sparta’s leadership and support for its proxies. This examination of a past proxy war resonates with our own troubled times, as today’s great powers struggle for international mastery while avoiding direct clashes of arms.—John Maurer, Alfred Thayer Mahan Distinguished Professor of Sea Power and Grand Strategy, US Naval War College The winners are said to write history. Yet the Sicilian Expedition is typically described from the defeated Athenians’ viewpoint. Paul Rahe portrays its disastrous war of choice as a massively successful Spartan proxy war, when Sparta’s small investment in Sicilian proxies yielded a huge payoff against its primary adversary, Athens. The lesson: sustaining someone else’s fight has a much higher potential return on investment than joining the fight directly. Bad news for Putin. —S.C.M. Paine, William S Sims University Professor of History and Grand Strategy, US Naval War College Is there more to be learned and are there new lessons to be drawn from Sparta’s war against Athens nearly 2,500 years ago? Yes, and they are set forth with crisp clarity and in sparkling prose by Paul Rahe in Sparta’s Sicilian Proxy War, his latest analysis of classical Sparta’s successful grand strategy against Athens. His analysis has much to teach both classics specialists and newcomers to the field about ancient Greece—and our world today.—Michael Barone, author of Shaping Our Nation Paul Rahe has outdone himself again. A learned study of Sparta’s proxy war against Athens in Sicily—replete with historical analysis and wise observations on grand strategy. It should be on the bookshelves of every strategist and statesman.—Jakub Grygiel, Professor of Politics, The Catholic University of America, and former Senior Advisor in the Office of Policy Planning at the U.S. Department of State