Magdalena Bieniak holds a PhD in Philosophy (University of Padua and University of Paris IV - Sorbonne). She holds a research fellowship at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Padua and is affiliated with the University of Warsaw.

• AcknowledgementsIntroductionPart OneTowards the unity of the Human Being1.1 Accidental union of the soul with the body and unibilitas substantialis of the human soul1.1.1 The accidental union of the soul with the body1.1.1.1 Avicenna and early Avicennianism1.1.1.2 Philip the Chancellor's Summa de bono1.1.2 The unibilitas substantialis of the human soul: Hugh of St-Cher and his contemporaries1.1.2.1 William of Auxerre1.1.2.2 Hugh of St-Cher's question De anima1.1.2.3 Roland of Cremona1.1.2.4 William of Auvergne1.1.3 Unibilitas substantialis after Hugh of St-Cher1.1.3.1 John of La Rochelle1.1.3.2 Albert the Great1.1.3.3 Bonaventure1.1.3.4 Thomas Aquinas1.2 The human soul and the concept of person1.2.1 "The human soul is not a person". The Sentences Commentary of Hugh of St-Cher1.2.2 Evolution of expressions1.2.2.1 Gilbert of Poitiers1.2.2.2 Pseudo-Peter of Poitiers and Simon of Tournai1.2.2.3 Alan of Lille1.2.2.4 Stephen Langton1.2.2.5 William of Auxerre1.2.2.6 Hugh of St-Cher1.2.3 "The separated soul is not a person". Controversies and misunderstandings1.2.3.1 From the question of universals to the individuality of the soul: Gilbert of Poitiers1.2.3.2 Simon of Tournai1.2.3.3 From logic to psychology: Alan of Lille1.2.3.4 Stephen Langton1.2.3.5 William of Auxerre1.2.3.6 Hugh of St-Cher1.2.3.7 Alexander of Hales1.2.3.8 Philip the Chancellor1.2.3.9 From the Summa Halesiana to Thomas Aquinas's Scriptum in SententiasPart TwoBetween Soul and Body: the Powers of the SoulIntroduction2.1 The Rational Powers: the Soul as Image of the Trinity2.1.1 Two Traditions, Two Types of Powers2.1.2 The identity of the soul with its powers2.1.2.1 The Augustinian and Pseudo-Augustinian heritage2.1.2.2 William of Auxerre2.1.2.3 Hugh of St-Cher2.1.2.4 An anonymous question (ms. Douai 434, n. 115)2.1.2.5 Philip the Chancellor and Alexander of Hales2.1.2.6 Peter of Bar2.2 The Sensitive and Vegetative Powers2.2.1 The Union per medium2.2.1.1 Philip the Chancellor2.2.1.2 Sources of the doctrine of intermediaries2.2.1.3 Hugh of St-Cher2.2.2 The Survival of the Sensitive and Vegetative Powers2.2.2.1 Hugh of St-Cher2.2.2.2 Avicenna and Dominicus Gundissalinus2.2.2.3 Quaestiones antequam esset frater2.2.2.4 Peter of Bar2.2.2.5 William of Auvergne2.3 The Problem of Memory2.3.1 Two traditions, two types of memory2.3.2 Philip the Chancellor2.3.3 The Summa Duacensis2.3.4 The disputed questions of Peter of Bar2.3.5 The Gloss of Alexander of Hales2.3.6 John of La Rochelle2.3.7 William of Auvergne's De anima: memory, the immortality of the soul and the resurrectionConclusionAppendix : Text EditionsIntroduction(A) The disputed questions (Douai 434)(B) Hugh of St-Cher's Sentences Commentary (I, 3)(C) AbbreviationsTexts(A) Hugo de Sancto Caro (B) Hugo de Sancto Caro (C) (D) Anonimi Si anima est sue potentie(E) Petrus de Barro De hiis que ex parte anime manebunt(F) AnonimiBibliography(A) Journals and Series(B) Manuscripts(C) Edited Sources(D) StudiesIndices

Magdalena Bieniak holds a PhD in Philosophy (University of Padua and University of Paris IV - Sorbonne). She holds a research fellowship at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Padua and is affiliated with the University of Warsaw.

• AcknowledgementsIntroductionPart OneTowards the unity of the Human Being1.1 Accidental union of the soul with the body and unibilitas substantialis of the human soul1.1.1 The accidental union of the soul with the body1.1.1.1 Avicenna and early Avicennianism1.1.1.2 Philip the Chancellor's Summa de bono1.1.2 The unibilitas substantialis of the human soul: Hugh of St-Cher and his contemporaries1.1.2.1 William of Auxerre1.1.2.2 Hugh of St-Cher's question De anima1.1.2.3 Roland of Cremona1.1.2.4 William of Auvergne1.1.3 Unibilitas substantialis after Hugh of St-Cher1.1.3.1 John of La Rochelle1.1.3.2 Albert the Great1.1.3.3 Bonaventure1.1.3.4 Thomas Aquinas1.2 The human soul and the concept of person1.2.1 "The human soul is not a person". The Sentences Commentary of Hugh of St-Cher1.2.2 Evolution of expressions1.2.2.1 Gilbert of Poitiers1.2.2.2 Pseudo-Peter of Poitiers and Simon of Tournai1.2.2.3 Alan of Lille1.2.2.4 Stephen Langton1.2.2.5 William of Auxerre1.2.2.6 Hugh of St-Cher1.2.3 "The separated soul is not a person". Controversies and misunderstandings1.2.3.1 From the question of universals to the individuality of the soul: Gilbert of Poitiers1.2.3.2 Simon of Tournai1.2.3.3 From logic to psychology: Alan of Lille1.2.3.4 Stephen Langton1.2.3.5 William of Auxerre1.2.3.6 Hugh of St-Cher1.2.3.7 Alexander of Hales1.2.3.8 Philip the Chancellor1.2.3.9 From the Summa Halesiana to Thomas Aquinas's Scriptum in SententiasPart TwoBetween Soul and Body: the Powers of the SoulIntroduction2.1 The Rational Powers: the Soul as Image of the Trinity2.1.1 Two Traditions, Two Types of Powers2.1.2 The identity of the soul with its powers2.1.2.1 The Augustinian and Pseudo-Augustinian heritage2.1.2.2 William of Auxerre2.1.2.3 Hugh of St-Cher2.1.2.4 An anonymous question (ms. Douai 434, n. 115)2.1.2.5 Philip the Chancellor and Alexander of Hales2.1.2.6 Peter of Bar2.2 The Sensitive and Vegetative Powers2.2.1 The Union per medium2.2.1.1 Philip the Chancellor2.2.1.2 Sources of the doctrine of intermediaries2.2.1.3 Hugh of St-Cher2.2.2 The Survival of the Sensitive and Vegetative Powers2.2.2.1 Hugh of St-Cher2.2.2.2 Avicenna and Dominicus Gundissalinus2.2.2.3 Quaestiones antequam esset frater2.2.2.4 Peter of Bar2.2.2.5 William of Auvergne2.3 The Problem of Memory2.3.1 Two traditions, two types of memory2.3.2 Philip the Chancellor2.3.3 The Summa Duacensis2.3.4 The disputed questions of Peter of Bar2.3.5 The Gloss of Alexander of Hales2.3.6 John of La Rochelle2.3.7 William of Auvergne's De anima: memory, the immortality of the soul and the resurrectionConclusionAppendix : Text EditionsIntroduction(A) The disputed questions (Douai 434)(B) Hugh of St-Cher's Sentences Commentary (I, 3)(C) AbbreviationsTexts(A) Hugo de Sancto Caro (B) Hugo de Sancto Caro (C) (D) Anonimi Si anima est sue potentie(E) Petrus de Barro De hiis que ex parte anime manebunt(F) AnonimiBibliography(A) Journals and Series(B) Manuscripts(C) Edited Sources(D) StudiesIndices

Magdalena Bieniak holds a PhD in Philosophy (University of Padua and University of Paris IV - Sorbonne). She holds a research fellowship at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Padua and is affiliated with the University of Warsaw.

• AcknowledgementsIntroductionPart OneTowards the unity of the Human Being1.1 Accidental union of the soul with the body and unibilitas substantialis of the human soul1.1.1 The accidental union of the soul with the body1.1.1.1 Avicenna and early Avicennianism1.1.1.2 Philip the Chancellor's Summa de bono1.1.2 The unibilitas substantialis of the human soul: Hugh of St-Cher and his contemporaries1.1.2.1 William of Auxerre1.1.2.2 Hugh of St-Cher's question De anima1.1.2.3 Roland of Cremona1.1.2.4 William of Auvergne1.1.3 Unibilitas substantialis after Hugh of St-Cher1.1.3.1 John of La Rochelle1.1.3.2 Albert the Great1.1.3.3 Bonaventure1.1.3.4 Thomas Aquinas1.2 The human soul and the concept of person1.2.1 "The human soul is not a person". The Sentences Commentary of Hugh of St-Cher1.2.2 Evolution of expressions1.2.2.1 Gilbert of Poitiers1.2.2.2 Pseudo-Peter of Poitiers and Simon of Tournai1.2.2.3 Alan of Lille1.2.2.4 Stephen Langton1.2.2.5 William of Auxerre1.2.2.6 Hugh of St-Cher1.2.3 "The separated soul is not a person". Controversies and misunderstandings1.2.3.1 From the question of universals to the individuality of the soul: Gilbert of Poitiers1.2.3.2 Simon of Tournai1.2.3.3 From logic to psychology: Alan of Lille1.2.3.4 Stephen Langton1.2.3.5 William of Auxerre1.2.3.6 Hugh of St-Cher1.2.3.7 Alexander of Hales1.2.3.8 Philip the Chancellor1.2.3.9 From the Summa Halesiana to Thomas Aquinas's Scriptum in SententiasPart TwoBetween Soul and Body: the Powers of the SoulIntroduction2.1 The Rational Powers: the Soul as Image of the Trinity2.1.1 Two Traditions, Two Types of Powers2.1.2 The identity of the soul with its powers2.1.2.1 The Augustinian and Pseudo-Augustinian heritage2.1.2.2 William of Auxerre2.1.2.3 Hugh of St-Cher2.1.2.4 An anonymous question (ms. Douai 434, n. 115)2.1.2.5 Philip the Chancellor and Alexander of Hales2.1.2.6 Peter of Bar2.2 The Sensitive and Vegetative Powers2.2.1 The Union per medium2.2.1.1 Philip the Chancellor2.2.1.2 Sources of the doctrine of intermediaries2.2.1.3 Hugh of St-Cher2.2.2 The Survival of the Sensitive and Vegetative Powers2.2.2.1 Hugh of St-Cher2.2.2.2 Avicenna and Dominicus Gundissalinus2.2.2.3 Quaestiones antequam esset frater2.2.2.4 Peter of Bar2.2.2.5 William of Auvergne2.3 The Problem of Memory2.3.1 Two traditions, two types of memory2.3.2 Philip the Chancellor2.3.3 The Summa Duacensis2.3.4 The disputed questions of Peter of Bar2.3.5 The Gloss of Alexander of Hales2.3.6 John of La Rochelle2.3.7 William of Auvergne's De anima: memory, the immortality of the soul and the resurrectionConclusionAppendix : Text EditionsIntroduction(A) The disputed questions (Douai 434)(B) Hugh of St-Cher's Sentences Commentary (I, 3)(C) AbbreviationsTexts(A) Hugo de Sancto Caro (B) Hugo de Sancto Caro (C) (D) Anonimi Si anima est sue potentie(E) Petrus de Barro De hiis que ex parte anime manebunt(F) AnonimiBibliography(A) Journals and Series(B) Manuscripts(C) Edited Sources(D) StudiesIndices