Social Influence and the Logic of Collective Action

Sergey Gavrilets is Distinguished Professor of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology and Mathematics at the University of Tennessee Knoxville. He is the author of Fitness Landscapes and the Origin of Species (Princeton).

• PrefaceAcknowledgmentsCommon Mathematical Symbols1 Human Behavior in Collective Action1.1 Objectives, Outcomes, and Obstacles in Collective Action1.2 Biological Roots of Human Sociality1.3 Forces Involved in Collective Action1.3.1 Human Motivation1.3.2 Material Costs and Benefits1.3.3 Attitudes, Personal Norms, and Morality1.3.4 Social Influence1.3.5 Cognitive Processes1.3.6 Beliefs and Belief Dynamics1.3.7 Between-Individual Differences1.4 Building a Theory of Collective Action1.4.1 Philosophical Inquiry into Collective Action1.4.2 Classical Game Theory1.4.3 Evolutionary Game Theory1.4.4 Behavioral Economics1.4.5 Gaps in Collective Action Theory1.5 A Need for a Unified Model of Collective Action1.6 Book Structure2 Collective Action in Classical and Evolutionary Game Theories2.1 Social Dilemmas and Nash Equilibria2.1.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma2.1.2 Volunteer’s Dilemma2.1.3 Linear Public Goods Game2.2 Mancur Olson’s “The Logic of Collective Action” (1965)2.3 Evolutionary Game Theory2.4 Collective Action Problems2.4.1 Public Goods Production2.4.2 Resource Exploitation2.4.3 Collective Risk Avoidance2.5 Between-Group Conflicts2.6 Effects of Between-Individual Differences2.7 Coordination Within Groups2.8 Factors Maintaining Cooperation2.8.1 Real-Life and Behavioral Experiments2.8.2 Punishment2.8.3 Extending Theory2.9 Summary and Conclusions3 Evolutionary Emergence of Social Influence3.1 Population Genetic Modeling3.2 Unbiased Social Learning3.2.1 Infinite State 𝑇-Cycle Environment3.2.2 Two-State 𝑇-Cycle Environment3.2.3 Infinite-State Random Environment3.2.4 Competition of Types Relying on Innate, Individually Learned, and Socially Learned Behaviors3.3 Biased Social Learning3.3.1 Conformist Bias in Learning3.3.2 Payoff Bias in Learning3.4 Evolution of Personal Norms and Social Norm Internalization3.4.1 Socialization3.4.2 Assortment and Kantian Preferences3.4.3 The Evolution of Personal Standards Into Social Norms3.4.4 Inculcation3.4.5 Personal Norms and Conformity3.5 Summary and Conclusions4 Dynamics of Social Influence4.1 Discrete Opinion Space4.1.1 Culture as an Infection4.1.2 Complex Contagions4.1.3 Population Genetics-Type Models4.2 Continuous Opinion Space4.2.1 DeGroot Model4.2.2 Heterogeneity in Personality Traits4.2.3 Heterogeneity in Social Partners4.2.4 Effects of Homophily, Repulsion, and Biased Assimilation4.2.5 Authorities and Hubs4.2.6 The Dynamics of Social Power4.2.7 Effects of Latent Preferences and Authority4.2.8 Multi-Dimensional Opinions and Logic Constraints4.2.9 Utility Functions and Stochasticity4.3 Summary and Conclusions5 Dynamics of Behavior with Social Influence and Stable Personal Norms5.1 Rashevsky Model5.2 Schelling–Granovetter Model5.3 Dynamic Norms5.4 Norm-Utility Approach5.4.1 Spread of Social Unrest5.4.2 Tipping at Restaurants5.4.3 Academic Journal Review Process5.4.4 Linear Public Goods Game5.4.5 Sanctioning in Culturally Tight and Loose Societies5.4.6 Breaking Injunctive Social Norms5.4.7 Norms and Metanorms in a Collective Action5.4.8 Culture Wars5.5 Summary and Conclusions6 Dynamics of Behavior with Social Influence and Evolving Personal Norms6.1 Immoral Behavior and Cognitive Dissonance6.1.1 Rational Choice Approach6.1.2 Coevolution of Actions and Beliefs6.2 The Granovetter Model with Evolving Thresholds6.3 Cultural Integration6.3.1 Cultural Integration in Partially Segregated Populations6.3.2 Cultural Integration and Polarization on Networks6.4 Linear Public Goods Game6.5 Collective Behavior in Heterogeneous Groups6.6 Political Polarization6.7 Effects of Inculcation and Propaganda6.7.1 Food-Sharing in Small-Scale Societies6.7.2 Political Protests6.8 Summary and Conclusions7 Coevolution of Actions, Attitudes, and Beliefs About Others7.1 The Integrative Model7.1.1 Dynamics and Equilibria7.1.2 Generalization and Implications7.2 Pluralistic Ignorance, Spirals of Silence, Preference Falsification, and Cultural Evolutionary Mismatch7.2.1 Model7.2.2 Parameters and Initial Conditions7.2.3 Model Predictions and Their Interpretation7.3 Differences Between the Two Approaches7.4 Summary and Conclusions8 Testing and Validating the Integrative Model in Behavioral Experiments8.1 Experimental Approach8.2 Estimation8.3 Results8.3.1 Common Pool Resource Experiments8.3.2 Collective Risk Experiments8.3.3 Comparison of the CPR and CR Experiments8.4 Summary and Conclusions9 Modeling Online Behavior9.1 Online Actions, Beliefs, Payoffs, and Social Influence9.2 Epidemiological Models9.3 User Behavior and Content Interaction9.4 Temporal Dynamics and Social Influence9.5 Vaccination and Opinion Formation9.6 Effects of Feedback9.7 Political Polarization9.8 Spirals of Silence9.9 Battle for the Minds9.10 Summary and Conclusions10 Synthesis10.1 Theoretical Insights and Their Implications10.1.1 Social Influence10.1.2 Relative Weights of Different Factors10.1.3 Cognitive Processes10.1.4 Individual Differences10.1.5 Social Network Structure10.1.6 Personal and Social Norms10.1.7 Some Fascinating Manifestations of Collective Beliefs and Behaviors10.1.8 Cultural Tightness-Looseness10.1.9 Cooperation10.1.10 Online Behavior10.2 Data Analysis and Interpretation10.3 Policy and Practical Applications10.3.1 Connections with Behavior Change Theories10.3.2 Fostering Behavioral Change and Collective ActionBibliographyIndex