Social Design

Essays in Memory of Leonid Hurwicz

Inbunden, Engelska, 2019

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This book contains invited essays in memory of Leonid Hurwicz spanning a large area of economic, social and other sciences where the implementation or enforcement of institutions and rules requires the design of effective mechanisms.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2019-06-13
Mått155 x 235 x 25 mm
Vikt700 g
FormatInbunden
SpråkEngelska
SerieStudies in Economic Design
Antal sidor348
FörlagSpringer International Publishing AG
ISBN9783319938080

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Walter Trockel graduated in Mathematics (1971) at the University of Bonn (Germany). After he had written his dissertation, supervised by Werner Hildenbrand, during a stay at Berkeley in the group of Gerard Debreu, he received his doctoral degree in Economics (1974) from the University of Bonn. He is a Professor Emeritus at the Center of Mathematical Economics (IMW) of Bielefeld University where he had succeeded Reinhard Selten on his chair in Mathematical Economics in 1985. From 2012 to 2017 he was a professor at the Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies at Istanbul Bilgi University. He is a Managing Editor of the Springer Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, and had served in the editorial boards of JME, ET, IGTR, RED and JMID. He is a member of the Advisory Board of RED and a Fellow of the RCGEB at Shandong University, China. Since 2011 he has been a Fellow of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory.

In Lieu of an Introduction: How I Remember Leonid Hurwicz.- Institution Design: Technical Change and the Decentralization Penalty.- Fundamental Theory of Institutions: a Lecture in Honor of Leo Hurwicz.- The Hurwicz Program, Past and Suggestions for the Future.- Social Networks from a Designer's Viewpoint.- Design Under Uncertainties: Some Remarks on Bayesian Mechanism Design.- Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the Designer Does Not Know Endowments.- Design of Tradable Permit Programs Under Imprecise Measurement.- Second Thoughts of Social Dilemma in Mechanism Design.- Markets: Allocation Mechanisms, Incentives, and Endemic Institutional Externalities.- The Role of (quasi) Analyticity in Establishing Completeness of Financial Markets Equilibria.- Are We There Yet? Mechanism Design Beyond Equilibrium.- Rules: Formation of Committees Through Random Voting Rules.- Equal Area Rule to Adjudicate Conflicting Claims.- Implementation: Recent Results on Implementation with Complete Information.- Unrestricted Domain Extensions of Dominant Strategy Implementable Allocation Functions.- Self-Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences in Strong Equilibrium.- New Directions in Design: Domains Admitting ex post Incentive Compatible and Respectful Mechanisms: a Characterization for the Two Alternatives Case.- Mechanisms in a Digitalized World.- Incentive Compatibility on the Blockchain.- Contextual Mechanism Design.