Akeel Bilgrami is Sidney Morgenbesser Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University.

• Preface 1. What Makes Self-Knowledge Special? 2. The Conceptual Basis for Transparency I: A Normative Conception of Agency 3. The Conceptual Basis for Transparency II: Evaluation, Agency and the Irrelevance of Cause 4. The Conceptual Basis for Authority I: Agency, Intentionality and the First Person Point of View 5. The Conceptual Basis for Authority II: Intentionality, Causality, and the Duality of Perspectives 6. Conclusion Appendix I: When Self-Knowledge Is Not Special (with a Short Essay on Psychoanalysis) Appendix II. Does the Debate Between Internal and External Reasons Rest on a Mistake? Notes Index

This is a distinctive and original treatment which covers an impressive sweep of philosophical ground, makes many original and surprising connections, and creates a whole new framework for thinking about self-knowledge and the philosophical landscape around it.

Akeel Bilgrami is Sidney Morgenbesser Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University.

• Preface 1. What Makes Self-Knowledge Special? 2. The Conceptual Basis for Transparency I: A Normative Conception of Agency 3. The Conceptual Basis for Transparency II: Evaluation, Agency and the Irrelevance of Cause 4. The Conceptual Basis for Authority I: Agency, Intentionality and the First Person Point of View 5. The Conceptual Basis for Authority II: Intentionality, Causality, and the Duality of Perspectives 6. Conclusion Appendix I: When Self-Knowledge Is Not Special (with a Short Essay on Psychoanalysis) Appendix II. Does the Debate Between Internal and External Reasons Rest on a Mistake? Notes Index

This is a distinctive and original treatment which covers an impressive sweep of philosophical ground, makes many original and surprising connections, and creates a whole new framework for thinking about self-knowledge and the philosophical landscape around it.

Akeel Bilgrami is Sidney Morgenbesser Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University.

• Preface 1. What Makes Self-Knowledge Special? 2. The Conceptual Basis for Transparency I: A Normative Conception of Agency 3. The Conceptual Basis for Transparency II: Evaluation, Agency and the Irrelevance of Cause 4. The Conceptual Basis for Authority I: Agency, Intentionality and the First Person Point of View 5. The Conceptual Basis for Authority II: Intentionality, Causality, and the Duality of Perspectives 6. Conclusion Appendix I: When Self-Knowledge Is Not Special (with a Short Essay on Psychoanalysis) Appendix II. Does the Debate Between Internal and External Reasons Rest on a Mistake? Notes Index

This is a distinctive and original treatment which covers an impressive sweep of philosophical ground, makes many original and surprising connections, and creates a whole new framework for thinking about self-knowledge and the philosophical landscape around it.