Seeing, Knowing, and Doing

Robert Audi is internationally known for his books, articles, and lectures in ethics (including political philosophy), the theory of knowledge, the philosophy of mind and action, and the philosophy of religion. His books since 2000 include Religious Commitment and Secular Reason (Cambridge 2000), a theory of the relation between church and state and, for individuals, between religion and politics; The Architecture of Reason (Oxford 2001), a theory of rationality that provides a partial foundation for ethics; The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value (Princeton 2004), a presentation of some main elements in Audi's view in ethics; Practical Reasoning and Ethical Decision (Routledge 2006), an account of the nature and varieties of practical reasoning and its relation to moral standards; Moral Value and Human Diversity (Oxford 2007), a non-technical presentation of major approaches in ethics and value theory; Rationality and Religious Commitment(Oxford 2011), a comprehensive monograph in philosophy of religion (derived from the Wilde Lectures given much earlier at Oxford); Moral Perception (Princeton 2013), a theory of perceptual moral knowledge and its relation to emotion, intuition, and objectivity in ethics; Seeing, Knowing, and Doing (Oxford 2020), an account of perception of the physical, apprehension of the abstract, and how both underlie our actions; Of Moral Conduct: A Theory of Obligation, Reasons, and Value (Cambridge 2023); and (as Editor) The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge, 3rd ed. 2015). Audi is a past president of the American Philosophical Association, a former director of National Endowment for the Humanities Seminars and Institutes, a recipient of prizes and honors for lifetime contributions to philosophy, a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and presently John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame. His B. A. is from Colgate University, his Ph.D.from the University of Michigan.

• Preface Acknowledgments Introduction Part One: Perception Chapter 1 Perception and Perceptual Belief: Seeing and Knowing the Physical World I. Perception Broadly ConceivedII. Four Structurally Distinct Cases of PerceptionIII. The Representational Character of Perception Chapter 2 Dimensions of Perceptual Content I. Three Categories of Perceptual ContentII. Singular Reference and the Possible Role of Russellian PropositionsIII. Perception and Belief: Cognitive and Conceptual Aspects Chapter 3 Perceptual Levels and their Action-Theoretic Counterparts I. Perception and Action: The Structural Analogy II. Constitutive Elements in the Visual Perception of Physical Objects III. Awareness of Events and Abstract EntitiesIV. The Epistemological Significance of Perceptual LevelsV. Is Perception Theory-Laden?VI. The Importance of "Background Beliefs" and Perceptual Levels VII. Aspectual Perception, Inference, and Recognition Chapter 4 Perception as a Source of Knowledge and Justification I. Perceptual KnowledgeII. The Hierarchical Character of PerceptionIII. Perceptual Justification: External and Internal DimensionsIV. The Perceptibility of Normative Properties Chapter 5 Reasons, Perceptual Grounds, and Normative Explanation I. The Diversity of Reasons for BeliefII. Reasons as Distinguished from GroundsIII. Reasons and Grounds for Belief: The Practical AnalogyIV. Reasons as ExplanationsV. Normative Reasons and their Grounds Chapter 6 The Autonomy of Justification I. Epistemological InternalismII. Does Knowledge Entail Justification?III. The Practice-Relativity of JustificationIV. An Integrated View of Knowledge and JustificationV. The Disjunctivist ChallengeVI. The Elusive Notion of the Content of Perceptual BeliefVII. Perception and Singular Reference Part Two: Perception and the A Priori Chapter 7 Perception, Intuition, and Apprehension I. Perception and IntuitionII. Structural Parallels between Intuitional and Perceptional DiscourseIII. Intuitions as Evidential Cognitions: Two Intuitionist TraditionsIV. Intuitions as Apprehensions Chapter 8 Toward a Theory of the A Priori I. The Concept of Self-EvidenceII. Understanding as Central for Knowledge of the Self-evidentIII. Understanding and ImaginationIV. Major Elements in the Understanding of PropositionsV. Degrees of Understanding and Propositional JustificationVI. Comprehensional AdequacyVII. Obstacles to Comprehension Chapter 9 Apriority, Disputability, and Necessity I. Self-Evidence and ProvabilityII. Can Rational Disagreement Extend to the Self-Evident? III. The Self-Evident, the Obvious, and the CredibleIV. Apprehension of Abstract EntitiesV. Apriority and Necessity Part Three: Practical Knowledge Chapter 10 Knowledge, Belief, and Action I. Belief and ActionII. Two Orders of Cognitive DispositionIII. Belief and Knowledge, Intention and Action Chapter 11 Knowing, Reasoning, and Doing I. Intellectualism as a Perspective on Action II. Practical Knowledge and Knowledge of the PracticalIII. Virtual Knowledge: A Neglected CategoryIV. The Place of Knowledge in Practical Reasoning Chapter 12 Inference and Its Role in Rational ActionI. Inference and Inferential BeliefII. Inference, Reasoning, and Premise-Based Belief-FormationIII. Reasoning and Rational ActionIV. The Scope of Rational ActionV. Intentionality, Knowledge, and Agency Conclusion: Perception, Apprehension, and Action References Index

Audi is one of the most distinguished and prolific analytic philosophers working today ... The argumentation in is rich and complex . . . the book represents an important contribution to current debates in epistemology and the philosophy of mind.