Russia Since 1980

Steven Rosefielde is Professor of Economics at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; Adjunct Professor of National Security Affairs, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and Adjunct Professor of Defense and Strategic Studies, Center for Defense and Strategic Studies, Southwest Missouri State University, Springfield. The author or editor of thirteen books on Russia and the Soviet Union, he has also published more than a hundred articles in journals such as the American Economic Review, European Economic Review, Economica, Soviet Studies, and Europe-Asia Studies. Professor Rosefielde is a member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences and was a Fellow of the Carnegie Corporation of New York from 2000 to 2003. He has served as a consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He has also advised several directors of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, the Central Economics and Mathematics Institute, Moscow for more than a quarter-century, and the Center for Defense and Foreign Policy, Moscow for more than a decade. Stefan Hedlund is Professor of East European Studies at Uppsala University, Sweden. Before 1991, his research was centered on the Soviet economic system. Since then, he has been focusing on Russia's adaptation to post-Soviet realities. This has included research on the multiple challenges of economic transition as well as the importance of Russia's historical legacy for the country's reforms. His latest book, among 16 authored and coauthored titles in English and Swedish, is Russian Path Dependence (2005). Professor Hedlund received a master's degree in economics from the University of California, Santa Barbara, and his doctorate in economics from the University of Lund, Sweden.

• Part I. Russia Before 1980: 1. Muscovy and the West; 2. Reform communism; Part II. Gorbachev: 3. Pandora's box; 4. Blindman's bluff; 5. Squalid superpower; Part III. Yeltsin: 6. Demolition and system building; 7. Crisis management; Part IV. Putin: 8. Authoritarian reconsolidation; 9. Heritage and neglect; Part V. Advance and Retreat: 10. Semblance of democracy; 11. Social change and adaptation; 12. International relations; Part VI. Prospects: 13. Sustainable growth; 14. Russia in the Chinese looking glass; Glossary.

'For all those who believe that Russia has turned a developmental or economic, not to mention political, corner, this is a necessary and hard-hitting corrective. It also is a sobering analysis of what Russian society has undergone for almost thirty years and is likely to experience in the future. After reading this bracing and valuable analysis, few, if any, analysts will be able to look at Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Putin in the same light as before. And for that we should be grateful.' Stephen Blank, Strategic Studies Institute US Army War College