Revisiting Searle on Deriving "Ought" from "Is"

Inbunden, Engelska, 2021

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The remainder of the volume is dedicated to a deep dive into Searle’s essay and its implications by international scholars with diverse backgrounds ranging from analytic philosophy, phenomenology, and logic, to moral philosophy and the philosophy and sociology of law.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2021-02-17
Mått148 x 210 x 25 mm
Vikt593 g
FormatInbunden
SpråkEngelska
Antal sidor344
Upplaga21001
FörlagSpringer Nature Switzerland AG
ISBN9783030541156

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Paolo Di Lucia is Professor of Philosophy of Law at the University of Milan, Italy. His research interests include the philosophy of normative language, social ontology, and philosophy of justice. His previous publications include Deontica in von Wright (1992), L’universale della promessa (1997), and Normatività. Diritto linguaggio azione (2003, Spanish translation 2009).Edoardo Fittipaldi is Professor of Sociology of Law at the University of Milan, Italy. His research interests include the epistemology of social sciences, legal realisms, and social ontology. Among his books are Scienza del diritto e razionalismo critico. Il programma epistemologico di Hans Albert per la scienza e sociologia del diritto (2003) and Everyday Legal Ontology (2012).

Part 1.- Chapter 1. How to Derive "Ought" from "Is" Revisited. John R. Searle.- Chapter 2. An Interview with John R. Searle. Paolo Di Lucia & Edoardo Fittipaldi.- Part 2.- Chapter 3. Is and Ought: Where Does the Problem Lie?. Pedro M.S.Alves.- Chapter 4. Searlean "Is" and "Ought" Revisited. Wojciech Żełaniec.- Chapter 5. Some Remarks on Searle's View on the Logic of Practical Reasoning. Marco Santambrogio.- Chapter 6. On the Regulative Functions of Constitutive Rules. Frederick Schauer.- Chapter 7. Existence as the Source of Normativity: An Alternative to Searle's Way. Roberto De Monticelli.- Chapter 8. How to Derive Is from Ought. Amedo Giovanni Conte.- Chapter 9. Searle vs. Conte on Constitutive Rules. Corrado Roversi.- Chapter 10. "Ought" is Spoken in Many Ways. Paolo Di Lucia.- Chapter 11. Constitutive Rules, Criteria of Validity, and Law. Matthew Grellette.- Chapter 12. Can Constitutive Rules Bridge the Gap Between Is and Ought Statements?. Frank A. Hindriks.- Chapter 13. Searle and Conte on Deriving Ought from Is. Jan Woleński.- Chapter 14. Why Moral Norms Cannot Be Reduced to Facts: On a Trilemma in Derivations of Moral "Ought" from "Is". Wojciech Załuski.- Chapter 15. On Searle's Derivation and its Relation to Constitutive Rules: A Social Scientist's Perspective. Edoardo Fittipaldi.