Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments

Häftad, Engelska, 1998

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R. Jay Wallace advances a powerful and sustained argument against the common view that accountability requires freedom of will. Instead, he maintains, the fairness of holding people responsible depends on their rational competence: the power to grasp moral reasons and to control their behavior accordingly. He shows how these forms of rational competence are compatible with determinism. At the same time, giving serious consideration to incompatibilist concerns, Wallace develops a compelling diagnosis of the common assumption that freedom is necessary for responsibility.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum1998-01-08
Mått143 x 227 x 19 mm
Vikt363 g
FormatHäftad
SpråkEngelska
Antal sidor288
FörlagHarvard University Press
ISBN9780674766235

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Filosofiska discipliner inom Filosofi och religion

Introduction The Problem The Solution Prospectus Emotions and Expectations The Approach Sketched Narrowing the Class Reactive and Nonreactive, Moral and Nonmoral Irrational Guilt Responsibility Responsibility, Blame, and Moral Sanction Responsibility and the Reactive Emotions The Reactive Account and Moral Judgment Methodological Interlude Understanding the Debate Strawson's Arguments Fairness Strategies Blameworthiness and the Excuses Excuses and Intentions Qualities of Will A Typology of Excuses Determinism and Excuses Accountability and the Exemptions Exemptions and Abilities Exemptions: Some Cases Determinism and Rational Powers Comparisons and Contrasts The Lure of Liberty Avoidability and Harm Opportunity and Possibility Difficulty and Control Oughts and Cans Conclusion Appendix: Further Emotional Vicissitudes Appendix: Alternate Possibilities Index