Resemblance Nominalism

A Solution to the Problem of Universals

Inbunden, Engelska, 2002

2 259 kr

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Gardeners, poets, lovers, and philosophers are all interested in the redness of roses; but only philosophers wonder how it is that two different roses can share the same property. Are red things red because they resemble each other? Or do they resemble each other because they are red? Since the 1970s philosophers have tended to favour the latter view, and held that a satisfactory account of properties must involve the postulation of either universals or tropes. But Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra revives the dormant alternative theory of resemblance nominalism, showing first that it can withstand the attacks of such eminent opponents as Goodman and Armstrong, and then that there are reasons to prefer it to its rival theories. The clarity and rigour of his arguments will challenge metaphysicians to rethink their views on properties.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2002-07-04
Mått144 x 225 x 18 mm
Vikt448 g
FormatInbunden
SpråkEngelska
Antal sidor252
FörlagOUP OXFORD
ISBN9780199243778

Tillhör följande kategorier

Introduction ; 1. The Problem of Universals: A Problem about Truthmakers ; 2. The Explananda of the Problems of Universals ; 3. The Many over One ; 4. Resemblance Nominalism ; 5. The Coextension Difficulty ; 6. Russell's Regress ; 7. The Resemblance Structure of Property Classes ; 8. Goodman's Difficulties ; 9. The Imperfect Community Difficulty ; 10. The Companionship Difficulty ; 11. The Mere Intersections Difficulty ; 12. The Superiority of Resemblance Nominalism ; Appendix: On Imperfect Communities and the Non-communities they Entail ; References, Index

Rodriguez-Pereyra . . . develops a novel understanding of the problem of universals, offers his own conception of truthmaking and examines the relative virtues of qualitative and quantitative economy. . . . [he] deserves praise for following arguments where they lead and challenging so many of the ingrained assumptions that metaphysicians routinely bring to bear upon the discussion of resemblance nominalism.